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INTRODUCTION

In recent years it has become commonplace to suggest that there is
a fundamental relationship between the observance of human rights and
international peace. Western writers often argue that democratic governance enhances peace' and that observance of human rights generally

* Associate Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova University; J.D. (1981),
Rutgers Law School, Camden; L.L.M. (1989), Harvard Law School.
1. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based Prospectsfor a New Global Order,
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enhances the genuineness of democracy.2 Nonwestern writers and
governments also frequently link human rights to international peace and
and social rights and the
stability but tend to stress instead economic
3
importance of economic development.
While these views and their variations are largely untested empirical4
ly, there is considerable support among States, international organizations, and academics for the general proposition that human rights and

22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 601, 621 (1990) [hereinafter Franck, Prospects];Thomas M.
Franck, The Emerging Right To Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 88-90 (1992)
(hereinafter Franck, Democratic Governance]; James A. R. Nafziger, The Security of Human
Rights: A Third Phase in the Global System? 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 173, 174-75 (1990). See
also Dinah Shelton, RepresentativeDemocracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere,

12 HUM. RTs. L.J. 353, 355 (1991). Some authors argue that the international community
should make democratic governance one of the criteria for judging the legitimacy of
governments. See, e.g., Franck, Democratic Governance, supra, at 76-77; W. Michael
Reisman, Editorial Comment, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 868-70 (1990); Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the

Rule of Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 965, 1065-66 (1990) (remarks of Jordan Paust).
However, simply defining democratic governance and the rights to political participation is
itself controversial. Henry J. Steiner, PoliticalParticipationas a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM.
RTS. Y.B. 77, 77-79, 84-91, 130 (1988); see infra text accompanying notes 60-71.
2. See, e.g., Panel, New Prospects and Initiatives for a Revived United Nations, 83 AM.
PRoc. 439, 451 (1989) (remarks of Herbert Reis); Panel, The Human Right
to Participatein Government: Toward an OperationalDefinition, 82 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc.
505 (1988); see also HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION
112-15 (1990) [hereinafter HANNUM, AUTONOMY]. It is often argued, particularly from the
SOC'Y INT'L L.

West, that liberal democratic institutions are necessary for the realization of human rights
generally. See, e.g., Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Document
of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, 29 I.L.M. 1305,
1307-08 (1990) [hereinafter CSCE: Copenhagen]; Angela Cornell & Kenneth Roberts,
Democracy, Counterinsurgencyand Human Rights: The Case of Peru, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 529,

531-32 (1990); Shelton, supra note 1, at 353; Nafziger, supra note 1, at 183. But see
Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 1081-83 (remarks

of Hurst Hannum) (noting that democracy itself does not necessarily lead to the realization of
human rights or social and economic justice).
3.

See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND

SOCIAL COUNCIL; WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-

GENERAL, at 7 (comments of Cuba), 16 (Tunisia), U.N. Doc. A/45/564 (1990) [hereinafter
WORLD CONFERENCE]. But see The Realization of Economic, Social and CulturalRights: Final
Report Submitted by Mr. Danilo Tairk, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Agenda
Item 8, at 5-6, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (1992) (noting recent shifts away from an
orientation favoring economic and social rights). See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 301, 307-11 (1986).
4. None of the authors cited in this article, for example, cite any direct empirical support
for the proposition that observance of human rights will lead to peace. Two authors cite
suspect historical studies which suggest that "democracies" (narrowly defined) do not wage war
against each other. Franck, Prospects, supra note 1, at 621 n.76; Nafziger, supra note 1, at
174. Even if this limited proposition is true, however, it may only indicate that nations with
similar economic, social, and political interests are less likely to resolve their disputes through
warfare. In any case, the colonial history of the United States and Western Europe have amply
demonstrated that democracy alone does not curb aggressive use of force.
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international peace are causally linked. 5 Thus, debate over human rights
values now nearly always figures prominently in matters of international
peace and security. Whether for sincere or cynical reasons, human rights
have become an important part of the rhetoric of armed conflict.
Similarly, many of the internal conflicts which threaten international
peace relate directly to such fundamental human rights as self-determination and the still maturing collective rights of ethnic and linguistic
minorities. 6 This perceived linkage between peace and human rights is
clearly reflected in the activities and pronouncements of the U.N.'s
various political organs.7
Perhaps encouraged by this strong international perception that human
rights are linked to peace, many commentators have urged a greatly
increased role for human rights in the so-called new world order.' These

5. See, e.g., New InternationalHumanitarianOrder: Report of the Secretary-General,

U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 95, at 4-5 (comments of Byelorussian S.S.R.), 6
(Czechoslovakia), 8-9 (Mongolia), 10 (Panama), 11 (U.S.S.R.), U.N. Doc. A/451524 (1990);
WORLD CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 8 (comments of Cyprus), 16 (Turkey); Implementation
of the Declaration on the Preparationof Societies for Life in Peace: Report of the Secretary-

General, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 70, at 10-11 (comments of Poland), U.N. Doc.
A/45/575 (1990); Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N.

GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 1, 1 67, 81, 109, U.N. Doc. A/47/1 (1992) [hereinafter Report
on the Organization]; S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1428th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/253 (1968) (Security Council proclaims that the denial of human rights and democracy
in S. Rhodesia is a threat to peace); G.A. Res. 118, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/118 (1992) (human rights as one of the "keystones in the arch of peace");
CSCE: Final Act, 14 I.L.M. 1292, ch. VII (1975); see also sources cited supra note 1; Theo
van Boven, The Role of the United Nations Secretariatin the Area of Human Rights, 24 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 69, 71-72 (1991).

6. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SECURITY COUNCIL, AN AGENDA FOR
PEACE; PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING:
REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, N 5, 15, 18-19, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111 (1992) [hereinafter
AGENDA FOR PEACE]; Report on the Organization, supra note 5, 1 90; see also Brenda
Cossman, Reform, Revolution, or Retrenchment? InternationalHuman Rights in the Post-Cold
War Era, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 339, 346-48 (1991). See generally HANNUM, AUTONOMY,
supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 6, U 5, 15; S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th

Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) (Somalia); S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991) (Iraqi Kurds); S.C. Res. 253, supra note 5 (S.
Rhodesia); Medium-Term Planfor the Period 1992-1997, Vol. II, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,

Supp. No. 6, 9135.3, 35.4, 35.21, U.N. Doc. A/45/6/Rev. 1 (1991); Report on the Organization, supra note 5, 91
90.
8. See, e.g., Franck, Democratic Governance, supra note 1; Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in
Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia & Haiti: Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian
Intervention Under International Law, Part 1, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 305 (1992);
Nafziger, supra note 1; Reisman, supra note 1; Franck, Prospects,supra note 1; see also Martti
Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood,32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 397, 397-400 (1991); Christianne
Bourloyannis, The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335, 353-55 (1992); Stanley
Anderson, Human Rights and the Structure of InternationalLaw, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &

Comp. L. 1, 26-28 (1991). Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has also recently suggested an
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reformers suggest, among other things, that the United Nations should
look to human rights, and in particular rights associated with democratic
governance, as a basis for collective decisions relating to peace and
security. The precise role suggested for human rights depends upon the
degree to which human rights are thought to justify collective international action based upon their relationship to peace. Thus, reform proposals

range from amorphous arguments for a "new phase" in the global security
system in which human rights considerations are directly "linked" to
international peace and security issues,9 to human rights justifications for
U.N. intervention. 0 Some authors have promoted selected human rights
- largely civil and political rights favored by Western liberal democracies - as suitable for various levels of enforcement action by the
political organs of the United Nations. One prominent commentator, for
example, has presented a series of arguments favoring a significant role
for "democratic entitlement" rights at the United Nations and within
international relations generally."
Similar arguments have been
developed on the basis of the right to self-determination. 2 All of these
arguments in some fashion involve the issues raised by the longstanding

increased role for human rights considerations in the work of the Security Council. See Report
on the Organization,supra note 5, 101 (urging authorization for the Secretary-General and
human rights institutions to report on human rights abuses and make recommendations for
action to the Security Council).
9.
See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 173-84.
10. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 8, at 305-06, 311, 330-34; Kevin Ryan, Rights,
Intervention,andSelf-Determination,20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 57-61 (1991); Michael
J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention in Light of the Atrocities
in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 598 n.242, 602-03, 616 (1987). See
also Bourloyannis, supra note 8, at 339-52. Some authors have also argued in favor of
unilateral human rights intervention under specified conditions. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato,
The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990);
Fernando R. Tes6n, Interdependence, Consent, and the Basis of International Obligation, 83
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 558, 563 (1989); Reisman, supra note 1, at 871-72; see also W.
Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter
Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); Panel, The Challenge of Universality, 83 AM.
SoC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 547 (1989). But see Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, Legality of
Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 645 (1984).
11. Franck, Prospects, supra note 1, at 621, 625-40; Franck, Democratic Governance,
supra note 1, at 46. Professor Franck argues, among other things, that a government should be
declared illegitimate and denied the "benefits of... membership" if the international community
determines that the government has denied its citizens democratic entitlement rights. See
Franck, Prospects,supra note 1, at 638-39. See generally Reisman, supra note 1, at 869-72.
12. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 10, at 61-66; see also James A. R. Nafziger, SelfDeterminationand HumanitarianIntervention in a Community of Power, 20 DENv. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 9, 12-20 (1991). The concept of self-determination is also critical to arguments
favoring collective action to support democratic entitlement rights. See, e.g., Franck,
Democratic Governance, supra note 1, at 52-60; Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and
the Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 1065-67 (remarks of Jordan Paust); see also Reisman, supra
note 1, at 871-72; Reisman, supra note 10, at 643-45.
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controversy over human rights-based "humanitarian intervention."' 3
These arguments suggest a wide spectrum of roles for human rights
in a revised U.N. security system and alternative approaches to human
rights reform generally. At one end of the spectrum are what might be
called strong enforcement-oriented reform models in which human rights
considerations would be directly utilized by U.N. political institutions as
the basis for collective enforcement actions. This approach implies a
range of possible enforcement actions depending upon the rights involved
and the perceived strength of the causal connection between those rights
and peace.14 Most fundamentally, enforcement-oriented reforms suggest
that important U.N. decisions regarding a whole range of actions affecting
peace and security are to be made, at least in part, on the basis of human
rights considerations.
At the other end of the spectrum are what could be described as
promotion-oriented reform models in which the United Nations would
increase its efforts, through institutional reforms, to promote adherence
to human rights as a subsidiary means of enhancing the prospects for
global peace.' 5 This more moderate approach to reform might suggest,
for example, that the link between human rights and peace justifies
significant institutional reforms which could make human rights more
definitive, subject to more effective multilateral supervision, and less
susceptible to rationalizing justifications or unilateral State action.
13. Arguments for U.N. reform incorporating human rights considerations are closely
related to the continuing debate over the propriety of "humanitarian intervention" outside of
the U.N. framework. See, e.g., Nafziger, supra note 12, at 21-27; Nanda, supra note 8, at
307-11. See generally Tom J.Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The JurisprudenceWar,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1991); Bazyler, supra note 10, at 569-96 (reviewing the doctrine's
history and providing numerous descriptive citations); Ryan, supra note 10; Reisman, supra
note 10; Schachter, supra note 10; FERNANDO R. TEs6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN
INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988).

14. Some authors contemplate the use of force including armed intervention. Nanda, supra
note 8, at 305-06, 311-31; Nafziger, supra note 12, at 31; Bazyler, supra note 10, at 581-96,
607-18. Historically, however, there has been little if any State support for the arguments
favoring military intervention to prevent human rights violations, whether based upon
multilateral decision-making or not. See Schachter, supra note 10, at 646-48; Farer, supra note
13, at 121-22. Indeed, the international community has shown a marked reluctance to
intervene in the affairs of sovereign countries even on the basis of the most egregious human
rights violations. See, e.g., Roger S. Clark, The "Decolonization" of East Timor and the
United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD.
2 (1980); Bazyler, supra note 10, at 578 n.134, 595-96. Other advocates of utilizing human
rights in U.N. security decisions believe that only non-forcible sanctions to support human
rights are advisable. See, e.g., Franck, Prospects, supra note 1, at 639-40.
15. The United Nations has taken some preliminary, tentative steps towards such
institutional reform of the U.N. human rights system. See, e.g., Effective Implementation of
International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under
InternationalInstruments on Human Rights: Note by the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Agenda Item 109, U.N. Doc. A/44/668 (1989) [hereinafter Report on Implementation];
Medium-Term Planfor the Period 1992-1997: Volume II, supra note 7, at 180-82.
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The purpose of this article is to evaluate the institutional and
normative capacity of international human rights to effectively serve such
enhanced roles in global peace and security matters. In particular, the
analysis focuses on key normative and institutional weaknesses in the
existing U.N. human rights system and addresses their implications for
the roles which human rights might serve to enhance peace. By
describing some of the system's fundamental weaknesses, this analysis
also indicates important areas for reform within the U.N. system.
Part I below develops a set of criteria for evaluating the effectiveness
and credibility of international norms and institutions. Part II utilizes
those criteria to explore weaknesses in the existing human rights
normative framework, including significant textual indeterminacy,
unresolved conflicts between rights, and the need for more uniformity and
coherence in the sources and content of States' human rights obligations.
Part III critiques related weaknesses in the U.N.'s human rights decisionmaking and interpretive capacity.
Overall, the following analysis suggests that significant institutional
reforms will be necessary if international human rights, including rights
relating to democratic governance, are to play an increased and positive
role in maintaining peace. Indeed, given the current institutional
immaturity of human rights it is conceivable that use of existing human
rights norms as a basis for collective security actions would lead to increased, not lessened, world tensions. Among other things, the United
Nations must radically strengthen its human rights decision-making
capacity, particularly its ability to credibly determine facts and to develop
authoritative interpretations of the specific content and meaning of
indeterminate human rights norms.
I. ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS

In order to evaluate the normative and institutional capacity of the
U.N. human rights regime to serve an enhanced role in global security,
it is first necessary to describe the attributes which those norms and
institutions must possess to achieve that task. Toward this end, it is
instructive to examine factors that commentators have6 commonly
associated with effective international law and institutions.'

16. "Effective" here is primarily meant in the functionalist sense common to international
law. See CASSESE, supra note 3, at 26-28. It is important to consider, however, that the
capacity of rules and institutions to achieve stated objectives and command compliance from
those affected is not the only, nor arguably the most important, criterion for evaluating a legal
regime. Arguably, attainment of substantive justice is also an important criterion upon which
to judge international law and institutions. Compare Dencho Georgiev, Letter to the Editor,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1989) with Thomas M. Franck, Is Justice Relevant To the International

Summer 19931

The Role of Human Rights

H.L.A. Hart has characterized international law as similar to a
primitive legal system. 17 According to Hart, a mature, effective legal
system relies on a hierarchy of rules and related decision-making
processes. 8 Primary rules of obligation constitute the basic substantive
norms which govern social behavior. 19 Critical to their function,
however, are a series of "secondary rules" which govern the process of
making, applying, and interpreting these primary substantive norms. 20
This hierarchy of rules, and rules about rules, is cemented together and
ultimately rendered effective by the existence of "rules of recognition"
which provide authority for identifying and validating the other rules. 2'
Hart sees international law as primitive essentially because its hierarchy
of secondary rules remains underdeveloped, and it lacks ultimate rules of
recognition. 21 Process-oriented critiques of international law such as
Hart's, along with more positivistic approaches emphasizing the international system's lack of a unified coercive sovereign, have commonly been

System?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 945 (1989). See also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 45-46, 211-46 (1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, LEGITIMACY];
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 96-104, 176-224, 403-07 (1986); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 151-201, 221-26 (1961).
17. HART, supra note 16, at 208-31.
18. Id. at 89-96. This general descriptive assertion is common among non-Marxist
Western legal scholars. See, e.g., DWORIN, supra note 16, at 410-13. Hart's focus on process
is shared by much of modern international law scholarship. See David Kennedy, A New Stream
of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 30-34 (1988).
19. HART, supra note 16, at 77-96. Rules prohibiting theft and murder, for example,
constitute basic primary rules of obligation in most domestic legal systems. Within
international law, U.N. Charter Article 2(4)'s prohibition against the use of force and rules
regarding States' territorial seas would satisfy Hart's description of such primary rules.
20. Id. These secondary rules of change, interpretation, and adjudication are processoriented rules such as those controlling evidence for appointed fact-finders, allowing repeal of
legislation, or determining violations of primary rules. Hart believes that international law is
severely underdeveloped in this regard - though it can be argued that international rules on
treaty interpretation and the formation of customary law, as well as the significant use of

international courts and arbitrators, are viable examples of such secondary rules.
21. Id. at 92-94, 97-107. Of special significance among a legal system's secondary rules
are these "rules of recognition" which, among other things, provide criteria for identifying and
validating primary rules of obligation. For Hart these rules of recognition may take the form
of an authoritative text, e.g., the U.S. Constitution, or rules requiring that laws be enacted by
a prescribed legislative process. "Ultimate" rules of recognition provide criteria for assessing
the validity of other rules. According to Hart, the international system lacks such rules though he recognizes that it can be argued that rules such as pacta sunt servanda (treaties must
be obeyed) and provisions of the U.N. Charter fulfill these roles. Professor Franck argues that
rules about statehood and membership in the international community provide international law
with the necessary rules of recognition. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 183-94.
22. Id. at 208-31. Hart rejects the claim that coercive sanctions imposed by the sovereign
explain, or are even prerequisite to, enforceable, valid law. See id. at 47-70. He nevertheless
clearly recognizes the significance of sovereign authority particularly as its absence may
adversely affect the enforceability of international law. See id. at 21-25, 82-85, 211-21.
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used to evaluate international law and the human rights system.23
A number of commentators have produced important responses to
Hart, as well as the more positivistic critiques of international law, in an
effort to explain how international law and human rights can effectively
function in the absence of a paramount sovereign and an organized
system of enforceable sanctions.24 Authors such as Professor Anthony
D'Amato have tried to squeeze international law into traditional sanctionbased enforcement theories of law. For example, D'Amato has argued
that enforcement of international law takes place through a loose system
of granting and withholding the "entitlements" of statehood. Similarly,
State compliance with international law norms is a function of the
expectation of reciprocal benefits and detriments or "retaliations"
associated with non-compliance.25 Specifically with regard to human
rights, D'Amato argues that such rights form part of each State's
international entitlements which if violated may justify various retaliatory
sanctions including deprivation of the violator's other international
entitlements.26
Other authors have de-emphasized the role of sanctions and enforcement in explaining how international law can create obligations and
induce State compliance. Oscar Schachter, for example, has argued that
international law norms become "obligatory" when the actors addressed
perceive that the lawmaker has the appropriate competence and authoribecome
"authoritative
(legitimate)"
when
ty.'
which
are appropriate
decision-makers
created International
or carried outnorms
"by entities

23. See, e.g., FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16; Gennady M. Danilenko, The Changing
Structure of the International Community: Constitutional Implications, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J.
353, 353-57 (1991); J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of
Human Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 609 (1979); Stanley Anderson,
Human Rights and the Structure of InternationalLaw, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1
(1991); see also Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 397-400, 402-05, 407-10.

24. Proposals for an increased role for human rights in a reformed United Nations could
conceivably call for a restructuring of current enforcement mechanisms under the Charter. It
is important to note, however, that most authors implicitly assume that the existing Charter
structure will remain essentially unchanged and focus their attention on expanding the
acceptable bases for various enforcement actions. But see Franck, Prospects, supra note 1, at
615-21 (arguing that the U.N.'s political institutions lack legitimacy and should be restruc-

tured). Given the lingering power of State sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs,
State equality, and nationalism, this appears to be a sound assumption. Thus, the analysis
which follows assumes that the Security Council will remain the only source of binding,
collective enforcement actions utilizing existing voting procedures.
25. Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1110, 1110-22 (1982) [hereinafter D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights]; see also
ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW:

PROCESS AND PROSPECT chs. 1-2 (1987).

26. D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights, supra note 25, at 1112, 1120-27. But see
Watson, supra note 23, at 609, 614-15, 618-19.
27. Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of InternationalObligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300,
307-10 (1968).
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for that purpose and in accordance with procedures which are considered
as appropriate., 28 The test, according to Schachter, is an empirical
evaluation of "legitimacy and effectiveness" with legitimacy being both
psychological and political. Factors which create this perception of
authority include "formal indicia of authority" - including proper
procedures and "linguistic symbols", the "context" in which the lawmaker
acts, some means of carrying out decisions, and the representative
character of the lawmaker.
Developing a similar theory based upon the work of Hart 29 and
Ronald Dworkin,3 ° Professor Thomas Franck claims that States comply
(most of the time) with those international rules which are perceived as
the "legitimate" product of "right process. '31 The more that the international community perceives that a rule or institution is legitimate, the
greater degree of "compliance pull" that norm or institution will have on
State behavior.32 According to Franck, there are four characteristics
which provide international norms and institutions with varying degrees
of legitimacy: 33 (1) "determinacy" (ability to communicate clear
meaning); 34 (2) "symbolic validation" ("pedigree" and cultural
authenticity); 35 (3) "coherence" (consistency in application and internal
logic); 36 and (4) "adherence" (consistency with the overall hierarchy of
rules governing the international system).37 The concept of legitimacy,
in a variety of forms, has also been identified as a significant element in

28. Id. at 311-12, 314.

29. Franck uses Hart's jurisprudential theories but disagrees with Hart's evaluation of the
international legal system, particularly concerning the existence of ultimate rules of recognition
and the maturity of international law's so-called "secondary rules" (i.e. process rules of change
and adaptation). See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 183-87.
30. Franck draws heavily upon Dworkin's jurisprudence as developed in LAw's EMPIRE,
supra note 16. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 15-19, 143-53, 202. Franck also
draws liberally from the sociological theories of legitimacy presented by Max Weber and
Jtrgen Habermas. See id. at 15-19. For an insightful critique of these and other theories about
legitimacy in law see generally Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of
Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 379 (1983).
31. FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 19-22, 25-26, 49, 64-66, 80-83, 87.
32. Id at 25, 38-39, 45-49, 174, 187, 193-99.
33. Franck does not purport to describe a self-sufficient, comprehensive account of State
compliance. Rather, his analysis of legitimacy and its four primary characteristics is presented
as merely a "hypothesis" about rule compliance in international law. Id. at 45-49.
34. Id. at 52-60. A vital corollary to textual determinacy for Franck is the process of
providing indeterminate textual norms with content through interpretation and application.
Franck describes this well-known phenomenon as "process determinacy." See iaUat 61-67,
86-87.
35. Id. at 91-96.
36. Id.at 135-53, 180-81.
37. Id. at 183-93.
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domestic legal systems.3" Franck's account of State compliance with
international law and the role of "legitimacy" also purports to describe
and predict the effectiveness of international institutions.39
Others have pointed out that compliance with international norms
may depend upon the coalescence of myriad factors including selfinterest,' economic pressures, political consensus, fear of sanctions, and,
at least partly, habit or culture.4 Ultimately, all of these factors may
revolve around the violating State's fear of losing the benefits of
membership in the international community.42 Human rights advocates
have also long emphasized the importance of intangible factors such as
moral suasion and the "mobilization of shame" in promoting compliance
by recalcitrant States. Indeed, human rights have demonstrated their own
dynamic as a catalyst of change which is not readily explained solely by
the factors normally associated with State compliance with international
law norms.
The various characteristics of effective international legal norms and
institutions which these commentators have described provide valuable
insights. Taken together, these insights indicate that in order to function
effectively as a basis for collective security actions within a reformed
United Nations, human rights and the U.N. system must provide: (1)
well-defined norms with a significant degree of commonly understood
meaning and content; (2) an accepted process of authoritatively interpreting such norms to elaborate standards, resolve conflicts, and develop
specific contextual meaning; and (3) a credible, fair decision-making
process through which to determine the facts that establish violations and
justify appropriate collective responses.
As described below, there are a number of significant normative and
institutional weaknesses in the existing U.N. human rights system which

38. See generally Hyde, supra note 30, at 387-89, 392-93, 397, 423 (providing a useful

description and critique of legitimacy in the sociology of law).
39. FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 51, 64-65. For an insightful critique of
Franck's account of legitimacy in explaining the effectiveness of international institutions see
Jose E. Alvarez, The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS by Thomas Franck, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 199 (1991).
40. International relations scholars, steeped in the tradition of political realism, often
suggest that it is primarily self-interest that dictates State behavior rather than any fidelity to
international law. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory:
A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 337-38 (1989).
41. See Alvarez, supra note 39, at 226-29; see also FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16,
at 37, 41-49, 204.
42. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 38-39, 190-202; D'Amato, The Concept
of Human Rights, supra note 25, at 1110-22. Franck posits that membership in the
international community and the rules of behavior associated with such membership supply the

ultimate "rules of recognition" identified by Hart as critical to an effective, mature legal system
with the power to induce compliance. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 187,
190-92. See also Danilenko, supra note 23.
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must be addressed at each of these levels if human rights are to occupy
a more prominent and effective position in a reformed United Nations.43

II. THE NEED FOR WELL-DEFINED NORMATIVE STANDARDS:
WEAKNESSES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
A comprehensive network of human rights norms are now firmly
entrenched as part of international law. 44 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 45 has won nearly universal acceptance at least at some
level of understanding. 46 Major multilateral human rights treaties such as
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant;47 the Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights Covenant;4 8 the Convention on the Elimination of All
43. The present article focuses on U.N. human rights institutions and existing human rights
norms. Proposals for enhancing global security through human rights could require the
development of new international norms or institutions. In addition, the U.N.'s main political
bodies, the General Assembly and Security Council, would inevitably play critical decisionmaking roles if human rights considerations were to become an important factor in global
security issues. There are important questions about the effectiveness, credibility, and
legitimacy of decision-making at these institutions. See, e.g., Franck, Prospects, supra note 1,
at 614-21; Thomas M. Franck, Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses - New Opportunities for
Reviving the United Nations System, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (1989).
44. A recent U.N. report on improving implementation of human rights found 65 different
U.N. sponsored instruments in operation within the U.N. human rights system. See Report on
Implementation, supra note 15, 22. See also Theo van Boven, The Future Codification of
Human Rights: Status of Deliberations - A Critical Analysis, 10 HuM. RTs. L.J. 1, 2 (1989)
(noting 67 human rights instruments adopted by the United Nations); COMPILATION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/REV.3, U.N. Sales No. E.88.XIV.1 (1988) (listing
67 human rights instruments adopted by the United Nations as of 1989). Among these
instruments are six major multilateral treaties with monitoring bodies having responsibility over
approximately 533 State Parties cumulatively. Report on Implementation, supra note 15,
IN 15-16. See Theodore Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights:
Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 754 (1982). In addition, there are three
major regional human rights networks in Europe, the Americas, and Africa respectively. Each
of these systems has created a relatively comprehensive set of operative human rights norms.
See generally Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1984) (citing 20 important
multilateral human rights treaties).
45. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration].
46. While nearly every State has expressed some endorsement of the Universal
Declaration, see, e.g., FINAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
at 4, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.32/41, U.N. Sales No. E.68.XIV.2 (1968); Setting International
Standards in the Field of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 120, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 41st Sess.,
Supp. No. 53, at 178, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986), questions linger about the meaning and depth
of this acceptance. See, e.g., Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western
Construct with Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS:

CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVES 1 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979); Alison Dundes Renteln,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM 30-32, 51-54 (1990).

47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter CPRC].
48. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, openedfor signature
Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. D, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
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Forms of Racial Discrimination;49 and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 5° each have over ninety
State Parties.5 ' Based on this achievement, academics and U.N. experts
have increasingly suggested that the U.N. human rights system has
basically completed its normative framework.
It is important, however, not to confuse the completion of a comprehensive network of abstract norms with the need for their continuing
development. The international human rights normative framework
suffers from fundamental weaknesses which must be addressed if human
rights considerations are to play a prominent and positive role in global53
security issues. These weaknesses include significant indeterminacy,

ESCRCI.
49. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979), 660
U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
50. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened
for signature Mar. 1, 1980, S. EXEC. Doc. R, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
[hereinafter CEDAW].
51. As of September 1990 ESCRC, CPRC, and the CPRC Optional Protocol had 97, 92,
and 50 State Parties respectively. UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INTERNATIONAL
COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS; STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND

POLITICAL RIGHTS; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/45/403 (1990). As of

August 1990 CERD had 129 State Parties, 14 of which had consented to the convention's
individual complaint mechanism. UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION; STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION; REPORT OF THE SECRETARYGENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/45/402 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE STATUS OF CERD]. As
of August 1990 CEDAW had 103 State Parties. UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN; REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL
9, U.N. Doc. A/45/426 (1990). With a potential of over 180 State

Parties a fair question is whether the glass is half-empty or half-full.
52. See Report on Implementation, supra note 15, I 126, 137-39, 148; van Boven, supra

note 44, at 1-3 (noting that while some analysts question whether new norm creation is needed,
most U.N. organs see the need for further standard setting, especially regarding disadvantaged
groups). Indeed, it has been suggested that the world has reached a saturation point in the
creation of human rights norms and that continuing efforts to create new norms may detract
from more important human rights concerns. See Report on Implementation, supra note 15,

I 110, 149; Panel, Reforming United Nations Human Rights Law Making, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 175, 187 (1985) (remarks of David Weissbrodt). There appears to be a developing
consensus that it is time for the United Nations to focus its efforts on problems of implementation. See G.A. Res. 120, supra note 46; WORLD CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 10-11
(comments of Ireland), 14 (Sweden), 15 (Switzerland), 23 (U.N. Sub-Commission); see also

Report on Implementation, supra note 15, 1 22, 143-44; van Boven, supra note 44, at 3, 5-6;
Francesco Capotorti, Human Rights: The Hard Road Towards Universality, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 977,977-78 (R.St.J. Macdonald & Donald M. Johnston
eds., 1983); Shelton, supra note 1, at 353-55; Franck, Democratic Governance, supra note 1,
at 78.
53. As discussed below, the significance of textual indeterminacy is primarily a function

of related weaknesses in the system's institutional decision-making capacity. See infra text
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unresolved conflicts between rights, and a lack of uniformity or coherence

in the sources and content of State obligations.
A. The Problem of Indeterminacy
Perhaps the most fundamental weakness in the present human rights
normative framework is its continuing textual and interpretive indeterminacy. To varying degrees depending upon the right, the catalogue of
rights consists of extremely vague, generally stated principles." Many
important rights are described in highly elastic terms such as rights to
"equal protection of the law," "freedom of thought," "self-determination,"
"work," "just and favorable conditions of work," "an adequate standard
of living," and prohibitions against "discrimination. 56 While some

accompanying notes 113-31.
54. The effectiveness and credibility of the U.N's human rights normative and institutional
framework also suffers from unresolved, lingering conflict between international supervision
and enforcement of rights and the fundamental international law principles of non-interference
in domestic affairs and equal sovereignty among States. See, e.g., Capotorti, supra note 52,
at 977-78; CASSESE, supra note 3, at 148-49; Watson, supra note 23, at 609-10; see also
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Low?, 77 AM. J.INT'L L. 413
(1983). The important issues raised by these lingering tensions and contrasting State
approaches to them are, however, well beyond the scope of this article.
55. See Douglas L. Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The
Search for Meaningful Standards,27 STAN. J.INT'L L. 345, 368-69, 382-86 (1991); see also
Steiner, supra note 1, at 77-86; Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 399-400, 405-06. But see
DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 39-41 (1991) (arguing

that the indeterminacy of human rights "can be overstated"). The analysis in this article
focuses almost entirely on indeterminacy in the sense of a rule's ability to convey (usually via
some text as in the case of treaty law) concrete, specific meaning commonly understood by
those to whom it is addressed. It is important to note, however, that international human rights
may also exhibit problems of adjudicative or interpretive indeterminacy and inherent conceptual
contradictions similar to those which commentators have argued exist within the doctrinal law
of any legal system. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). See generally Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy,
77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989). International legal scholars have recently begun to apply critiques
similar to the claims of critical legal studies to the international legal system. See, e.g.,
Kennedy, supra note 18, at 28-39; MARIT KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989). See generally Phillip R. Trimble,

InternationalLaw, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811 (1990);
Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81
(1991).
56. The texts of some rights are more specific and provide significantly more guidance
than others. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 50, arts. 11, 13; CPRC, supra note 47, art. 14(3).
Some rights have also been partly clarified by the U.N. General Assembly's adoption of
specific non-binding "guidelines" or "declarations." See, e.g., G.A. Res. 33, U.N. GAOR, 40th
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 206, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986) (adopting Standard Minimum Rules for
the Administration of Juvenile Justice: U.N. Doc. A/Conf.121/14 and Corr. 1); G.A. Res. 146,
U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 254, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986); Body of Principles
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res.
173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 297, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989); Declarationon
the Eliminationof All Forms of Intoleranceand of DiscriminationBased on Religion or Belief,
G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
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degree of abstraction and general language is perhaps necessary to any
multilateral human rights treaty,5 7 such language provides little textual
guidance as to a right's specific content and meaning. 8 Experience has
shown that formal State consensus over such broadly worded human
rights standards tells us little about the depth of actual State agreement
59
about such content.
This indeterminacy is reflected in those rights typically thought to be
most important to democracy and international peace. For example,
rights to participate in government,' freedom of expression and
association, 6' and self-determination" are three sets of rights commonly

57. The use of general abstract language both allows needed interpretive flexibility and
the vagueness necessary to accommodate cultural and political diversity. See Donoho, supra
note 55, at 368-71. While the use of such language creates the conditions necessary for
widespread agreement, it may also falsely indicate consensus over meaning. Id.; DAVID P.
FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS 39, 180 (1983); see also Abdullahi A. AnNa'im, Conclusion to HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (Abdullahi A. AnNa'im ed., 1992) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES]; THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWMAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 126 (1986); FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 238;
J.A. Andrews, The European Jurisprudence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REV. 463, 477-79
(1984); Forsythe, supra note 55, at 238.
58. See, e.g., Donoho, supra note 55, at 368-71, 378-86; Steiner, supra note 1, at 77,
85-86, 130; Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 399-400, 405-06. See also FRANCK, LEGITIMACY,
supra note 16, at 53-56.
59. See, e.g., WORLD CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 10 (comments of Iran), 14 (Sweden);
see also Donoho, supra note 55, at 368-71, 378-86; Steiner, supra note 1, at 80-93; Abduhalli
A. An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach To Defining International Standards of
Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 57, at 19.
60. The right to political participation implicitly finds expression in numerous political and
civil rights as well as economic and social rights.

Cf. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND

SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, QUESTION OF THE REALIZATION IN ALL
COUNTRIES OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, AND STUDY OF SPECIAL
PROBLEMS WHICH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FACE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THESE
HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING:
POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN ITS VARIOUS FORMS AS AN
IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DEVELOPMENT AND IN THE FULL REALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS;
STUDY BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 6, 15-28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/10 (1985). Its most

widely adopted direct expression, however, is in article 21 of the Universal Declaration and
article 25 of the CPRC. While neither of these provisions make explicit reference to democracy per se, both expressly require participation which will reflect the free expression of popular
will. CPRC, supra note 47, art. 25(b); Universal Declaration, supra note 45, art. 21(3).
61. See CPRC, supra note 47, arts. 18-19, 21-22; Universal Declaration, supra note 45,
arts. 18-20.
62. The right to self-determination is expressed in a multitude of international instruments,
including articles 1(2) and 73 of the U.N. Charter and article 1 of both the CPRC and ESCRC.
Prominent among the seemingly endless General Assembly resolutions referring to selfdetermination are the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1971), and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1966). See generally HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 27-49.
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thought fundamental to democracy.63 Yet, each is sufficiently vague to
permit a host of potentially contradictory interpretations. The right to
participate in government, for example, explicitly requires universal
suffrage, secret "genuine" elections, and the right to run for elected
office. 64 Does it also require meaningful opportunities to petition the
government, sponsor referenda, or seek recall of public officials? Are
there institutional frameworks -. such as the one-party States of Africa,
the People's Republic of China's rule by Central Committee,6 5 or Islamic
theocracies6 - which cannot satisfy the right? Is the right to "take part"
in government meaningful when related rights such as education,
participation in cultural life, a free and autonomous press, and freedom
of association are not observed? 67
Does the right to "genuine," "periodic," and "secret" elections require
multiparty, competitive election campaigns or some form of proportional
representation as favored by liberal Western democracies? 68 Is districting
or gerrymandering allowed? Are elections fair and genuine when
economic forces, lack of education, and oppressive social structures

63. See, e.g., Franck, Democratic Governance, supra note 1, at 52, 75; Steiner, supra note
1, at 86-89; CSCE: Copenhagen, supra note 2, at 1307-12; Frank Przetacznik, The Basic
Collective Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations As A Prerequisitefor
Peace, 8 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 49, 50-68, 86-92, 104-05 (1990).
64. CPRC, supra note 47, art. 25; Universal Declaration, supra note 45, art. 21. When
discussing what any particular human rights "text" may require, it is important to note that
different States are in fact subject to different sources of human rights obligations. See infra
text accompanying notes 102-12. Since these sources of obligation may contain different
textual versions of the same rights, there may be no universal textual version of a particular
right. Id.
65. See Donoho, supra note 55, at 384-85.
66. See Democracy Denied in Algeria, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at A2; A Prelude to
Civil War?, TIME, Jan. 27, 1992, at 30 (both describing the dilemma created for democracy by
the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Algeria).
67. See, e.g., AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 6, 81; Steiner, supra note 1, at 108-13;
Franck, Democratic Governance, supra note 1, at 75-76; Panel, The Human Right to
Participatein Government: Toward an OperationalDefinition,supra note 2, at 508, 510, 515;
HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 112-15. Most commentators would agree that elections
alone do not ensure either democracy or human rights. See, e.g., id. at 112-16; Tom J. Farer,
Elections, Democracy, and Human Rights, 11 HuM. RTs. Q. 504, 509-11 (1989).
68. In the view of some, simple majoritarian politics may often trample on the interests
of cultural or ethnic minority groups. See HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 112-16.
Nevertheless, the United Nations itself has begun to emphasize the majoritarian electoral
process and election monitoring in recent years. See Report on the Organization,supra note
5, 96; G.A. Res. 130, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (1992); G.A. Res. 137, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (1992); Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Questions,
Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principleof Periodicand Genuine
Elections; Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. G.A., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(b), U.N.
Doc. A/47/668 (1992), supplemented by U.N. Doc. A/47/668/Add.l (1992); see also Franck,
Prospects, supra note 1, at 634-38; Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of
Law, supra note 1, at 1070-73 (remarks of Amy Young).
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conspire to dictate inevitable results?" Is public financing of political
campaigns necessary to provide adequate opportunities for all to seek
public office? These and other uncertainties about the meaning of this
textually indeterminate right have been the source of continuing academic
Indeed, academic
and political debate since the right's inception.7'
literature and political history amply demonstrate that the concept of
democracy is itself subject to myriad variations even when politically
loaded adjectives such as "genuine" are stricken from the discourse.7
Diverse interpretations of rights are not only invited by the textual
elasticity of such norms but also, in the case of association and expressive
rights, by so-called "accommodation clauses." In this regard, the
textually open rights to "freedom of expression" and "freedom of
association" are subject to such restrictions as may be "necessary" to
preserve "national security" or "public order, or public health or
morals."72 In essence, these clauses invite the world's diverse States to
limit rights in ways which those States themselves deem appropriate
As might be expected, these
given their national circumstances.
indeterminate texts have given rise to diverse, controversial, and often
contradictory interpretations throughout the world.73
Similarly indeterminate are the rights of ethnic and cultural minorities74 and the right to self-determination. 75 These two sets of rights,

69. See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 1, at 105; see also Symposium, Transitions to Democracy
and the Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 1080-83 (remarks of Hurst Hannum) (arguing that

neither elections nor democracy necessarily imply observation of human rights and that
observation of human rights alone will not ensure social justice or development).
70. See Steiner, supra note 1, at 90-94, 96-129; see generally Panel, The Human Right
to Participatein Government: Toward an Operational Definition, supra note 2.
71. See generally DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987).

72. E.g., CPRC, supra note 47, arts. 19, 22.
73. See Donoho, supra note 55, at 382-83; Steiner, supra note 1, at 83; MERON, supra
note 57, at 114-15; Note, Press Licensing Violates Freedom of Expression, 55 U. CIN. L. REV.
891, 897-98, 919 (1987). But see Franck, Democratic Governance, supra note 1, at 61

(suggesting that speech rights have developed the necessary determinacy as interpreted by
international organizations to support adoption of a right to democratic governance).
74. See HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 63-70, 110-11; see also S. James Anaya,
The Capacity of InternationalLaw to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, 75 IOwA
L. REV. 837, 841-42 (1990).

75. Although referred to in numerous international agreements, see supra note 62; infra
note 110, textual versions of the right to self-determination leave its meaning opaque. Thomas
Franck, however, has argued that the right has been sufficiently explicated by international
organizations to contain a reasonable core of concrete meaning and to support collective U.N.

actions based upon democratic entitlement. See Franck, Democratic Governance, supra note
1, at 57-60; see also FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 153-74. Continuing academic
and political debate about the right once it is extended beyond its traditional anticolonialist or
"external" form indicates that this is an overly optimistic assertion. In contrast, Hurst
Hannum, in a study of self-determination as it relates to the rights of cultural and ethnic
minorities, found that there currently is no agreed upon definition of either self-determination
or minority group rights in international or national law. HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note
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which are fundamentally at issue in many of the major conflicts now
plaguing the world, 76 generated controversy and political tension even
before their emergence as conventional human rights law. Indeed, debate
over their specific meaning and conflicts between them is inevitably
involved in any modern discourse about democracy, human rights, and
international peace.77 Yet, despite their fundamental importance in
international relations, and intense political and academic scrutiny, the
rights remain ill-defined and controversial. Like many other textually
indeterminate rights, the elasticity and indefiniteness of these norms have
rendered them largely rhetorical political concepts rather than meaningful
entitlements. 8
Some degree of indeterminacy is inherent to any system of legal
rules. Indeed, most existing international human rights are no more
textually indeterminate than similar "constitutive" norms found in
domestic legal systems.79 There are, however, a number of costs related
to textually indeterminate human rights that are particularly problematic
within the international system. First, the degree of potential variation
and conflicting interpretations arising out of indeterminate international
human rights norms is enormous. The international community is
obviously a very diverse place with many variations on the major
competing economic and political models. 80 The law itself, and human
2, at 27-30, 39, 41-49, 60-73; see Nafziger, supra note 12, at 15-20; Clark, supra note 14,
at 24-3 1; see also HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 143-44,
190-91 (1987); Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determinationand International Law, 7 Wis. INT'L L. J. 51, 52-60, 84-94 (1988); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF
DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES; PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, PRELIMINARY
REPORT SUBMITTED BY MR. ASBJ0RN EIDE, POSSIBLE WAYS AND MEANS OF FACILITATING THE
PEACEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS INVOLVING MINORITIES, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/43 (1991); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1991/53 (1991) (Draft Declaration).

76. See Report on the Organization,supra note 5, 90; AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note
6, U1 17-19.
77. AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra, note 6, 11 17-19; see HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note
2, at 27-49; FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 160-65; Franck, Democratic Governance,
supra note 1, at 57; Nafziger, supra note 12, at 17-20; Reisman, supra note 1, at 866-69;
Przetacznik, supra note 63, at 49-50, 104-05.
78. Even more opaque and porous than civil and political rights are the whole set of
economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the ESCRC - rights which are often correctly
seen as fundamental both to the observance of other human rights and ultimately to peaceful
international relations. Rights to a decent standard of living, work, and property, for example,

obviously mean something very different to government leaders in the People's Republic of
China than they did to the Bush Administration. See Donoho, supra note 55, at 384-85.
79. See, e.g., MERON, supra note 57, at 2-3, 118.
80. See generally ADDA B. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL
WORLD (1971); Masaji Chiba, Cultural Universality and Particularityof Jurisprudence, in
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rights in particular, often mean different things to different people in
different social and cultural contexts."' The potential for conflicting
variations in rights resulting from this diversity is compounded by the
fact that it is the States themselves which originally interpret the meaning
and content of international rules.8 2 This is particularly true in terms of
conventional human rights law since most human rights treaties create at
most "obligations of result" under which each State has the initial and
primary responsibility for implementing the rights set forth in the treaty. 3
A second and perhaps primary cost of such indeterminacy is the
degree to which it ultimately undermines the right's credibility. Experience has shown that States may have fully divergent understandings about
the meaning of a right despite their agreement over the text of the norm.84
In the case of genuine conflict over the meaning and specific content of
a particular right, the existence of meaningful mutual State agreement and
consent to be bound to that right may be questioned. As the world's
diverse States continue to manifest unresolved and sometimes fundamentally contradictory views about what their various human rights obligations actually entail, doubt persists about the existence of meaningful,
reciprocal obligations. Without firm expectations of reciprocal behavior,
States are less likely to implement rights meaningfully, especially when
doing so is contrary to their own perceived short term interests.8 5 At the
same time, significant textual indeterminacy allows recalcitrant States and
egregious human rights violators the definitional flexibility to defend their
practices through cynical interpretations of the norms. Violators of
clearly defined, specific norms such as torture typically choose to deny
the factual basis for alleged abuses. 6 For alleged violations of the more

ESSAYS ON THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE

303 (M.L. Marasinghe & William

E. Conklin eds., 1984).

81. Adda B. Bozeman, Law, Human Rights and Culture, in THE MORAL IMPERATIVES OF
A WORLD SURVEY 25, 26-29 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1980); Chiba,

HUMAN RIGHTS:

supra note 80, at 306-11, 320-24.

82. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 399-404.
83. See generally Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of State Parties'
Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9
HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 164-77 (1987); Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant
in Domestic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 311 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
84. See Donoho, supra note 55, at 382-86. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 399,
404. This textual vagueness and elasticity allows the international community to "paper over"
fundamental underlying conflicts over meaning. See FORSYTHE, supra note 57, at 39, 180;
Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 83, at 9-11.
85. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; Watson, supra note 23, at 618-19,
624-25; see also Steiner, supra note 1, at 80, 82.
86. See Steiner, supra note 1, at 80, 82; Memorandum for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 595
n.34 (1980).
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abstract and elastic political, economic, and social rights, however,
abusing States tend also to exploit textual indeterminacy to rationalize
and justify their behavior based upon strained interpretations of their
obligations.8 7 Most significantly, such uncertainties over meaning tend
to undermine allegations of abuse and make the potential for credible
sanctions more remote. This, in turn, allows States to take their
obligations less seriously. It also makes it more difficult for international
monitors to clearly distinguish State rhetoric about alternative views of
rights from legitimate claims about cultural and social diversity. Overly
elastic human rights norms, therefore, not only cannot provide States with
the critically important expectation of reciprocal, mutually conforming
behavior, they also fail to provide a clear basis for finding and sanctioning violations.
These circumstances directly contribute to a third, related cost of
textual indeterminacy: inconsistent interpretation and application of
human rights standards to seemingly like cases by both the States
themselves and by the U.N.'s political institutions. As noted above,
States play a significant role in initially interpreting the meaning of rights
through domestic implementation decisions. 88 They also add an
interpretive gloss to rights when defending their own human rights record
and in taking foreign policy actions relating to human rights in other
nations. Such State-derived interpretations of rights are manifestly
subject to political expediency as well as the influence of genuine
diversity.8 9 As a result, these State-endorsed interpretations of elastic,
indeterminate human rights norms are often contradictory, inconsistent,
and seemingly cynical. 9° Also subject to the vagaries of politics, the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), the central U.N. human rights

87. See Steiner, supra note 1, at 80, 86; Capotorti, supra note 52, at 992-95; Richard Falk,
Cultural Foundations for the Protection of Human Rights, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 57, at
44, 55.
88. There are good reasons to doubt whether State implementation decisions add
significant content to international human rights since most States either cynically maintain that
their existing domestic law already fully meets their international obligation, see Capotorti,

supra note 52, at 996-97; infra notes 137, 169, or make liberal use of reservations to ensure
that no changes in domestic law are required by adoption of the treaty. See, e.g., Letter from
President Bush Urging Senate Advice and Consent to the CPRC, S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, 102d

Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992); see also Donoho, supra note 55, at 364 n.79; Human Rights
Commission Approves Principles to Protect Rights of Mentally Ill; Asks for Third Decade
Against Racism, U.N. CHRONICLE, June 1991, at 36, 38-39.

89. Human rights has proven a convenient banner for many States to further their
international political interests as witnessed by debate over the occupied territories in the
Middle East and the Reagan administration's cynical use of human rights to further its
perceived interests vis-h-vis the former Soviet Union, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S

RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1988, at 1-8 (1989).
90. See, e.g., id.; Falk, supra note 87, at 55.
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institution, has over the years produced highly politicized, inconsistent
pronouncements about human rights situations worldwide.9
Such
inconsistency was evidenced in 1992 by the CHR's condemnation of
Cuba at the behest of the United States while lightly rebuking or failing
to condemn even more egregious human rights violations in other parts
of the world, most notably in China.' A similar criticism can also be
leveled against the U.N. General Assembly which, for example, has
aggressively - and deservedly - condemned Israeli treatment of
Palestinians while nearly ignoring gross human rights abuses elsewhere,
including near genocide in East Timor and Uganda.93 While such
seemingly hypocritical decisions are clearly a function of political
alliances, shifting priorities, and expedient blindness to apparent facts, the
uncertain requirements of relevant human rights norms has also played a
significant role in creating this unfortunate record. Such inconsistent
treatment of human rights "situations" by the CHR and General Assembly, and manipulation of human rights by States in their international
relations, also undermines the perceived legitimacy of the norms
themselves. 94
Given the degree of textual indeterminacy present in the existing human
rights normative framework and the pressures of vast cultural diversity, it
seems clear that a great deal of normative development, in the form of
interpretive elaboration of the meaning and specific content of rights, is a

91. See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 29, 64, 70-71, 153-54, 188, 198-205; Penny Parker
& David Weissbrodt, Major Developments at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1991,
13 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 575, 579, 584-85, 589, 593 (1991); see also Juliana G. Pilon, The U.N.
& Human Rights: The Double Standard, Heritage Foundation Report, 1982, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Hfrpts File (although politically biased, this report provides an accurate
factual review of the CHR's activities); JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, DICTATORSHIPS AND DOUBLE
STANDARDS (1982). Arguably, however, such inconsistencies primarily reflect the CHR's focus
on fact-specific, general "situations" versus the meaning of specific rights as applied to
individual cases. Indeed, the CHR is designed primarily as a political institution - a fact
reflected in its shifting priorities and politically colored agenda. See TOLLEY, supra note 75,
at 174, 180-204.
92. See, e.g., Carlos Batista, Cuba: Diverse Reactions Over Human Rights Condemnation
at U.N., Inter Press Service, Mar. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File;
Philippe Naughton, Iraq Accused of "Massive" Human Rights Abuses, Reuters News Reports,
Mar. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
93. See Bernard D. Nossiter, U.N. Assembly, Rebuffing Soviet, Seats Cambodia Regime
of Pol Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1979, at Al; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE
TO COLONIAL AND OTHER DEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES; STUDY OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATION IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1371 (1980); Bazyler, supra

note 10, at 578 n.134, 595-96; Watson, supra note 23, at 611-12; Thomas M. Franck, Of
Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double Standardat the United Nations? 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
811, 825 (1984).
94. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 142-49, 174. Consistent application is
also a necessary attribute of effective decision-making institutions. See id.
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priority if human rights are to fulfill their potential for enhancing international peace.
B. The Problem of Unresolved Conflicts Between Rights
The problem of indeterminacy among human rights norms significantly contributes to a second major normative weakness in the current
system: unresolved actual and potential conflicts between human rights.
Conflicts between rights are an inevitable result of any comprehensive
system of legal norms which, like the international system, is derived
from multiple, largely uncoordinated, nonhierarchical sources.95 As noted
by many commentators, a number of important conflicts already appear

within the current international system.

6

Important examples of such

conflict include the exercise of religious freedom versus non-discrimination provisions, 97 and the clash between group rights such as cultural
integrity and many individual entitlements.98 Perhaps more fundamental
to the potential role of human rights in promoting peace is the ill-defined
interface between still maturing minority group rights, 99 self-determination, and State sovereignty.'0° Indeed, as noted earlier, conflicting
interpretations of these largely political concepts lie at the heart of many
of the world's currently most volatile threats to peace.' ' Many other

95. See infra text accompanying notes 102-12.
96, See, e.g., MERON, supra note 57, at 49-50, 78-79, 152-54; Panel, Resolving
Conflicting Human Rights Standards in InternationalLaw, 85 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 336
(1991); Report on Implementation, supra note 15, 1 126.
97. See Abdullahi An-Na'im, Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of
Cultural Relativism, 9 HUM. RTs. Q. 1 (1987); Steiner, supra note 1,at 82-83; Panel, Resolving
Conflicting Human Rights Standards in InternationalLaw, supra note 96, at 344-46 (comments
of Donna J. Sullivan), 353 (comments of Tom Farer); MERON, supra note 57, at 154-60.
98. See, e.g., Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article 5(4) of the Optional
Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No. R.6124, U.N. GAOR 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981)
(concerning Sandra Lovelace); Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article 5,
Paragraph4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; Communication No. 197/1985 Kitok v. Sweden (Views adopted on 27 July 1988 at the
thirty-third session), U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 221, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988);
see also HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 63-69; Allan McChesney, Aboriginal

Communities, Aboriginal Rights, and the Human Rights System in Canada, in PERSPECTIVEs,
supra note 57, at 221, 236-39; Diane Bell, Considering Gender: Are Human Rights for
Women Too? An Australian Case, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 57, at 339.
99. See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 143-44; HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note 2, at 4-5,
63-72.
100. See generally HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supranote 2, at 4-10; Nafziger, supra note .12,
at 9-21; see also Anaya, supra note 74, at 837-42; TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 190-91;
AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 6, f1 17-18; Karen Reierson & David Weissbrodt, The FortyThird Session of the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discriminationand Protectionof
Minorities, 14 HUM. RTs. Q. 233, 251-54 (1992).
101. See supra notes 76-77.
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potential conflicts among rights will manifest themselves as the process
of implementing human rights matures. The high degree of indeterminacy which characterizes most international human rights standards provides
ample room for such conflicts to arise and makes their resolution more
difficult. An examination of these actual and potential conflicts (and
priorities) among rights is beyond the scope of this article. Their
continuing existence, however, reflects the immaturity of many important
human rights norms.
C. The Problem of Nonuniformity and Incoherence in the Sources and
Content of State Human Rights Obligations
A third major weakness of the human rights normative framework is
its lack of uniformity or coherence in the sources and content of State
obligations. The international human rights system is currently characterized by diffuse sources of State obligations. Human rights obligations for
U.N. members, for example, may arise from any number of multilateral
treaties created under U.N. auspices,102 obligations of a more inchoate
nature may arise pursuant to Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, 1°3 and a
limited number of rights obligations are accepted as customary international law.1 4 States may also be subject to human rights obligations
outside the U.N. system through membership in regional organizations
and treaties. While all U.N. members are subject to the Charter-based
and customary international law obligations, such sources are limited in
scope and controversial in content.0 5 Membership in the various

102. See supra note 44; Report on Implementation, supra note 15,
15.
103. See generallyOscar Schachter, The Charterand the Constitution: The Human Rights

Provisions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 646-53 (1951).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 702 (1987). Some authors argue (with inordinate optimism) that the entire Universal
Declaration is now part of customary international law. See, e.g., John P. Humphrey, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in
HUMAN RIGHTS:

THIRTY

YEARS AFTER

THE

UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION,

30-36 (B.G.

Ramcharan ed., 1979). But see Watson, supra note 23, at 629-35; Pollis & Schwab, supra note
46, at 1-4.
105. The U.N.'s Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities pay scant attention to the source of a State's
human rights obligations, often considering matters for which the subject State has never
expressly adopted or otherwise consented to an obligation. TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 109,
120, 124-32, 136. Arguably these institutions derive authority to consider such issues by virtue
of Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter. It is commonly argued that the Universal
Declaration supplies the content for these Articles. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 104, at
30-34; see also G.A. Res. 120, supra note 46, at 178; B.G. Ramcharan, Substantive Law
Applicable, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 26,
37-39 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1982). Nevertheless, few States would accept the argument that
they are bound to the entire corpus of international human rights law simply by virtue of their
Article 55 and 56 Charter obligations. Even if States accepted this position, however, it would
not establish agreement on the content and meaning of the Universal Declaration's abstractly
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multilateral treaty regimes remains far from universal and varies from
treaty to treaty."° Even within the confines of each treaty, the content of
each State's obligations often varies as the result of extensive reservations.10 7 There is, therefore, no clearly unified body of human rights law
binding on each member of the international community. Different States
are in fact subject to different obligations.
This confusing state of affairs is compounded by the fact that these
different sources of legal obligation often purport to declare and protect
overlapping rights.' It Thus, the rights to free speech and association, for
example, are expressed in no less than nine major international instruments.1' 9 Similarly, the right to self-determination finds voice in a
number of major treaties and a multitude of other international instruments," 0 rights to political participation are expressed in at least nine
major treaties,' and the concept of non-discrimination is virtually
ubiquitous among the myriad sources of potential State obligations. This

stated norms. See Donoho, supra note 55, at 361, 369-72. Adding a layer of complexity to
this ill-defined web of obligations, some treaties expressly obligate State Parties to respect the
principles set forth in the Universal Declaration. See, e.g., CERD, supra note 49, arts. 4, 7.
106. See supra notes 44, 51.
107. Donoho, supra note 55, at 364 n.79.
108. See, e.g., List of Articles Showing the Nature and Extent of Overlapping Under Six
International Human Rights Instruments: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1989/3 (1988).
109. See, e.g., CPRC, supra note 47, arts. 18-19, 21; CERD, supra note 49, art. 5(d) (see
also art. 4 prohibiting certain speech); American Convention on Human Rights, opened for
signature Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 12-13, O.A.S.T.S., No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 99; Banjul Charter on

Human and Peoples' Rights, opened for signature June 27, 1981, arts. 8-11, 21 I.L.M. 58
(originally titled "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights") [hereinafter Banjul Charter];
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Jan. 26, 1990, arts. 13-14, G.A.
Res. 25, U.N. GAOR 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), 28 I.L.M.
1448; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, arts. 9-11,213 U.N.T.S. 221 (commonly known as the "European Convention"); see also
CSCE: Copenhagen, supra note 2, 9.1; Universal Declaration, supra note 45, arts. 17-19;
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, arts. 1,6, U.N.
Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
110. E.g., U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; CPRC, supra note 47, art. 1; ESCRC, supra note 48, art.
1; Banjul Charter, supra note 109, art. 20; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe:
Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, pt. VIII, at 1295; see also supra note 62.
111. CPRC, supra note 47, art. 25; Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened
for signature Mar. 31, 1953, arts. I-III, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, March 20, 1952,
art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 262; CERD, supra note 49, art. 5; CEDAW, supra note 50, art. 7;
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 109, art. 23; Banjul Charter, supra note
109, art. 13; see also Universal Declaration, supra note 45, art. 21; 1989 Convention
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries, openedfor signature June
27, 1989, art. 6, 28 I.L.M. 1382; Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M.
190; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Report to the CSCE Council From
CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions, Nov. 15,1991, 31 I.L.M. 375; supra note
60.
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array of overlapping rights obligations creates a great potential for
confusion, contradiction, overextension of resources, and conflicting
interpretations of the same or related rights." 2 Moreover, the lack of
coherence and uniformity in States' human rights obligations directly
exacerbates the problems of indeterminacy and unresolved conflicts
between rights described above. In turn, each of these problems serves
to undermine the effectiveness of the normative framework.
III.

AN EVALUATION OF THE

U.N.'s

HUMAN RIGHTS

DECISION-MAKING AND INTERPRETIVE CAPACITY

Each of the normative weaknesses described above has direct
implications for the future role of human rights in enhancing international
peace as well as for United Nations' efforts to implement, monitor, and
enforce human rights obligations. Significantly, most of these weaknesses are also common in some degree to any comprehensive set of rules
governing social behavior. Yet many domestic legal systems manage,
more or less successfully, to deal with such problems and command a
strong degree of compliance and perceived legitimacy."'
Explanations for the success of domestic legal systems in this regard
may vary, but most would agree that a well-developed process of
decision-making through which legal norms are interpreted and applied
in accordance with generally accepted procedures is critical." 4 Of course,
many important characteristics distinguish the international legal system
from a municipal one in this regard." 5 Yet the international system's

112. The system is correspondingly characterized by an array of overlapping monitoring
responsibilities. See infra text accompanying notes 132-37. See generally Theodore Meron,
Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional
Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 754 (1982); Report on Implementation, supra note 15.
113, Many legal theorists have attempted to explain citizen compliance with law as, at
least partly, a function of the perceived legitimacy of legal institutions, decision-making
processes, and norms. See generally Hyde, supra note 30. In a thoughtful article summarizing
and critiquing these theories, Alan Hyde argues that traditional concepts of legitimacy lack
empirical support and that the influence of perceived legitimacy upon behavior is weak at best.
Id. at 408-26. Hyde argues instead that obedience or not to law can best be explained on the
basis of rational decision-making about the content of the law, self-interest, and fear of sanction
by those affected. Id. Franck and other process-oriented international lawyers tend to
deemphasize such factors and reject moral content as a criterion for international institutional
and normative legitimacy. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 21-26, 31-39, 64,
235-36; Schachter, supra note 27, at 304-12, 317-21.
114. See, e.g., HART, supra note 16, at 75-96, 102, 109-13, 121-44; DWORKIN, supra note
16, at 211-14, 255-75; see also FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 15-19; Hyde, supra
note 30, at 400-07 (summarizing and critiquing uses of process-oriented concepts of
legitimacy).
115. In the international arena, for example, the difficult implications of indeterminacy,
diversity, and conflicting priorities are far more pronounced than in any existing domestic
polity. See Donoho, supra note 55, at 348-55. Nor is there a reliable, certain source of
coercive power in the form of a sovereign through which to enforce the legal system's

Summer 19931

The Role of Human Rights

capacity to cure the problems of indeterminacy, conflicting standards,
overlapping obligations, and profound diversity - as well as improve the
general effectiveness of its rules - depends equally on the quality and
credibility of its interpretation and decision-making processes. Thus, as
explained in Part I, the United Nations must provide a generally accepted
process of authoritatively interpreting rights and rendering credible
decisions regarding their application if human rights are6 to play a positive
role in maintaining international peace and security."
As described below, however, the U.N. system exhibits some of its
most critical weaknesses here at the level of institutional decision-making.
This is particularly true of its capacity to develop clear, specific standards
through authoritative interpretation, application, and monitoring of rights
and to render credible, fair enforcement and sanctioning decisions. It is
concerning this process that U.N. reformers should focus their greatest
efforts if international human rights considerations are to figure positively
in issues of international peace and security.
A. Characteristicsof Effective International
Decision-making Institutions
Many analysts of international and municipal legal systems have
described the crucial contribution of a legitimized, credible decisionmaking process to a legal system's effectiveness.7 This work suggests
that the normative weaknesses described above could be at least partially
alleviated by a strong institutional decision-making process which
credibly provides specific content to rights, resolves conflicting interpretations, and fairly evaluates alleged violations."' Such a process is also
critical to proposals for making human rights considerations an important

decisions.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 16-43.
117. See supra notes 18,34 and accompanying text; see, e.g., FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra

note 16, at 61-64, 83-88, 193-99; Franck, Prospects,supra note 1, at 626-28; MERON, supra
note 57, at 2-3, 118, 134-35, 175, 269-71; FORSYTHE, supra note 55, at 39-40; Reisman,
supra note 1, at 875; Andrews, supra note 57, at 473, 477-78; see also HART, supra note 16,
at 208-31; Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 399-400, 402-07; Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371 (1991); Jack
Donnelly, InternationalHuman Rights: Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599 (1986).
118. It is important to recognize that it may be appropriate or even necessary, for reasons
of policy, credibility, or efficiency, to allocate different decision-making tasks - such as factfinding, interpretation, conflict resolution, and sanctioning violations - to different institutions.
Thus, the Security Council and General Assembly are probably not appropriate institutions to
conduct basic fact-finding or render legal interpretations of human rights, and independent
bodies of experts are probably neither appropriate nor effective for ordering sanctions for
human rights violations. Such divisions of authority present complex institutional issues which
are beyond the scope of this article, but on their face they seem to demand significant
restructuring of the U.N. system. See supra note. 43.
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element of collective security decisions at the United Nations. Among
those characteristics of effective decision-making institutions most often
cited, six appear particularly important in evaluating the potential role of
international human rights and human rights institutions in promoting
world peace.
First, the decision-making and interpretive process must be perceived
as credible and authoritative to those to whom its decisions are directed.' 19 This requires that the relevant institutions have recognized competence and clearly defined and accepted mandates for the tasks assigned
to them. 20 It also requires that the process produce decisions that are
authoritative within the overall rule system or at least clearly located
within a hierarchy of authority.' A strong, authoritative interpretation
process, which is perceived as legitimate by States, is particularly critical
if human rights norms are to be used as a basis for collective action in a
reformed United Nations. Such a process is necessary to give indeterminate, elastic human rights a specific content which unambiguously
communicates the State's obligation and by which State behavior may be
fairly judged for legitimate enforcement activities. 22
Second, this decision-making process must have fair, well-developed
mechanisms for hearing and resolving disputes presented through agreed
upon, credible procedures.' 23 Particularly when interpreting rights, the
opportunity to resolve concrete disputes is important. These mechanisms
must be capable of fairly presenting all information necessary to the
decision and providing adequate opportunities for those affected to be
heard. 24 The perception that decisions and interpretations are only made

119. See, e.g., FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 61-64; Schachter, supra note 27,
at 307-12; Reisman, supra note 1, at 875-76; Johnstone, supra note 117, at 374-76.
120. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 27, at 308-13. The criterion of institutional
competence cannot be separated from the expertise - and impartiality - of the decision-

makers themselves. Many commentators have raised serious questions about both the
competence of individuals serving on international human rights monitoring bodies and the
politicized nature of their deliberations. See MERON, supra note 57, at 276; Panel, Reforming
United Nations Human Rights Lawmaking, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 175, 176 (1986)
(remarks of Theodore Meron); Reed Brody et al., Major Developments in 1990 at the UN
Commission on Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 559, 587 (1990).
121. See, e.g., HART, supra note 16, at 208-31; MERON, supra note 57, at 173, 183,
200-02, 262-64; Report on Implementation, supra note 15,
127-28; Meron, supra note 44,
at 754-61.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 79-94.
123. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 8, at 26-27; Franck, Prospects,supra note 1, at 616;
Schachter, supra note 27, at 310.
124. See Thomas M. Franck & H. Scott Fairley, ProceduralDue Process in Human Rights
Fact-Finding by InternationalAgencies, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 308 (1980); Nicolas Valticos,
Foreword to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, at
VII, VIII-X; B.G. Ramcharan, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN
THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 105, at 1-2; see also G.A. Res. 176, U.N. GAOR,
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with complete information to which all concerned parties have fairly
contributed greatly enhances the credibility of an institution's decisions.
Third, this process must have well-developed, generally accepted
rules about decision-making - whether the task involved is supervision,
interpretation, evaluation of violations, or ordering remedial action such
as sanctions. 125 In essence, the decision-making process and its institutions must be governed by a minimal level of agreed upon jurisprudence
regarding how decisions are reached. It is critical in this regard that U.N.
institutions develop and adhere to a sound jurisprudence regarding the
delicate process of interpreting human rights in the context of diversity 26
and for fairly 27resolving factual disputes critical to applying such
interpretations. 1

Fourth, the relevant institutions must prove themselves credible28
through coherent and consistent applications of the rights they monitor.
In order to achieve a semblance of consistency and coherence among
human rights, it is vital to have a central, authoritative voice to give
uniform content and meaning to the rights promoted. Similarly, the
decisionmakers should - at least when fact-finding, and interpreting or
monitoring rights - be allowed a significant degree of independence and
recognized political neutrality.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly for human rights, the international decision-making process must develop rational doctrines which
accommodate the diverse cultural, social, and economic circumstances of
those affected by its decisions while nevertheless generating a uniform,
coherent body of law. In essence, decisions about the substance of rights,
in their specific requirements and interpreted meaning, must be perceived

35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 197 (1981); E.S.C. Res. 1870, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No.
1, at 23, U.N. Doc. E15544 (1974).
125. See, e.g., HART, supra note 16, at 77-150; FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at
61-64, 87-88, 181-84; MERON, supra note 57, at 134-35. See also Donnelly, supra note 117,
at 603-08; Johnstone, supra note 117, at 372, 374-78, 380-86 (discussing the concept of
"interpretive community" as a constraint on State interpretation of treaty obligations); supra
note 42 and text accompanying notes 18-23.
126. See Donoho, supra note 55, at 386-91; Panel, Resolving Conflicting Human rights
Standards in InternationalLaw, supra note 96, at 341.
127. See Franck & Fairley, supra note 124; Richard B. Lillich, Preface to FACT-FINDING

at VII (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1991); see also Johnstone,
supra note 117, at 419; Ved P. Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada Impact on World Order, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 395, 408-09 (1984); Theo van Boven, The
Role of the U.N. Secretariatin the Area of Human Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 69,
83 (1991); Declarationon Fact-Findingby the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance
of InternationalPeace and Security, G.A. Res. 59, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
290, U.N. Doc. A/46/59 (1991). On international fact-finding generally see FACT-FINDING
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS,

BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, supra; INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE
FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 105.

128. See, e.g.,

FRANCK, LEGITIMACY,

supra note 16, at 138-48, 180.
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as culturally and socially appropriate by the world's diverse States and

the people whose interests they hopefully represent. 29
Sixth, and finally, these institutions should have some means of
carrying out their decisions - that is, inducing compliance through
measures, coercive or otherwise - which appeal to the States' selfinterest by creating the expectation of some detriment from non-compliance. 30 Indeed, implicit to many of the reform proposals described above
is the assumption that the coercive authority of the Security Council

should be directed toward improving compliance with human rights
norms. 13'

The more that international human rights interpretive and decisionmaking processes exhibit the six characteristics described above, the more
likely it is that States will comply with their obligations and respect
human rights justifications for collective security actions. Unfortunately,
even a brief overview of the relevant processes of the U.N. system
reveals serious weaknesses in each of these six characteristics.
B. Human Rights Decision-making Within the U.N. System
Many U.N.-affiliated institutions have human rights decision-making,
fact-finding, and interpretive responsibility. 132 Primary among these are
the Charter-based Commission on Human Rights and its subsidiary
bodies, and the multilateral treaty institutions associated with the United

129. This requires, among other things, the development of interpretive doctrines which
strike a fair balance between State discretion, group and individual interests, and international
supervision. It is only through such a process that the international community can develop
specific, meaningful human rights standards while at the same time allowing sufficient
variations in their content to accommodate diversity and render them culturally sensitive. See
Donoho, supra note 55, at 377-78, 386-91; An-Na'im, supra note 59, at 19-29; Richard Falk,
Cultural Foundationsfor the InternationalProtectionof Human Rights, in PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 57, at 44-46. But see Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community and Human Rights, in
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 57, at 81-82, 90-99.
130. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 27, at 310; Watson, supra note 23, at 618-19. This
power of coercion need not be absolute and could come in many forms, including withdrawal
of a State's international "entitlements" associated with membership in the international
community. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. It is interesting that Thomas Franck,
the leading proponent of the power of "legitimacy" in inducing State compliance with
international law, also recognizes the significance of meaningful sanctions. See Franck,
Prospects, supra note 1, at 626-30.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15.
132. I have assumed throughout this article that the Security Council would have ultimate
responsibility for deciding to take enforcement actions against States whose human rights
violations threaten international peace. It should also be noted that the U.N. General Assembly
(and its third committee), the Secretary-General (and Secretariat), the Economic and Social
Council, specialized agencies, and the Security Council could all play important roles in human
rights interpretation and fact-finding. However, their roles in the critical interpretation and factfinding processes are currently underdeveloped and less central than that of the human rights
institutions. While important to the issues discussed here, I have for these reasons and space
limitations omitted direct discussion of their potential roles.
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Nations. 33 One of the most significant characteristics of both these kinds
of entities is that they function primarily - although not exclusively through monitoring and supervision."
Regardless of the source of
obligation, but particularly in the case of multilateral treaty regimes, the
initial task of norm interpretation is left to the State Parties themselves. 35
The primary role given to international institutions in this context is to
monitor the various States' initially discretionary decisions regarding
implementation of the rights.1 36 Thus, States have reserved for themselves a great deal of the interpretive authority relating to human rights
and play a critical role in the interpretation process. 37
1. Charter-based Monitoring Bodies
The primary institution concerned with human rights supervision at
the United Nations is the CHR. 3 The CHR, which reports to the General
Assembly through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), is
primarily a policy-making, political body consisting of fifty-three
governmental representatives who are assigned general responsibility for
overseeing human rights activities within the United Nations and
promoting "effective enjoyment" of human rights.' 39 The CHR's agenda

133. The most important of these multilateral treaty institutions are the CPRC's Human
Rights Committee (HRC) and committees of experts created to monitor the ESCRC (ESCRC

Committee), CERD (CERD Committee), and CEDAW (CEDAW Committee).

Other

multilateral treaty institutions include those created under the Convention Against Torture and

Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, openedfor signatureDec. 10,
1985, art. 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), G.A. Res. 46, U.N: GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 [hereinafter CAT] and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 109, art. 43.
134. Bilder, supra note 44; Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law,
supra note 1, at 1049-50 (remarks of Diane Orentlicher).
135. The CPRC, for example, obligates each State Party to "take the necessary steps ...
to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized." CPRC, supra note 47, art. 2(2). The ESCRC is even more accommodating of
State discretion, requiring only that each State "undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of rights."
ESCRC, supra note 48, art. 2(1); see also Donnelly, supra note 117, at 608; Anderson, supra
note 8, at 21-24; Capotorti, supra note 52, at 977-78; Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 406.
136. E.g., Donnelly, supra note 117, at 608, 617.
137. This systemic feature of international treaty law has invariably led States to interpret
their international human rights obligations to require no more than what their existing domestic
law already provides. See Capotorti, supra note 52, at 996-97; infra note 171; see also
Donoho, supra note 55, at 375; Johnstone, supra note 117, at 372 (States are predisposed to
interpret treaties to maximize their perceived self-interest); Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 406.
Thus, since most States appear to give lip service to implementation, the idea that States
interpret rights by giving them specific content through implementation is probably illusory.
This hollow legal formalism is exacerbated domestically as many States fail to scrupulously
follow their own legal system.
138. See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 215.
139. ECOSOC has expressly authorized the CHR to assist it in coordinating U.N. human
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consists primarily of public deliberations concerning "situations"
involving consistent patterns of "gross" human rights violations pursuant
to ECOSOC Resolution 1235," confidential procedures concerning such
situations under ECOSOC Resolution 1503,'4t promotional activities and
development of new human rights standards for ECOSOC and General
Assembly approval,14342 and supervision over the activities of its numerous
subsidiary organs.
Credible findings, under well-defined standards, regarding "situations"
of "gross" human rights abuses which threaten peace, could ultimately be
a sound first step to Security Council action based upon human rights
considerations.'" The CHR, as presently constituted, is ill-suited to
reaching such credible findings. Although its pronouncements are, in
principle, almost entirely fact-dependent, the CHR's investigative methods
are weak and underdeveloped. 45 More importantly, by its very nature,
rights activities. E.S.C. Res. 36, U.N. ESCOR, 1979 Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc.
E/1979/79 (1979). This resolution also implicitly ties the 1966 Covenants and the Universal
Declaration to Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter and instructs the CHR to use those instruments
to guide its efforts "for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights." ld. 2, 16. In
theory, the 70 or so States which have not become Parties to the 1966 Covenants, see supra
note 51, are not bound to their provisions. However, in practice the CHR has shown little
concern over legal niceties such as the source and nature of States' human rights obligations.
See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 109, 120, 124-32, 210; supra note 105.
140. E.S.C. Res. 1235, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 17, U.N. Doc. E4393
(1967).
141. E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. IA, at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
142. ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions authorize the CHR to, among other
things: (1) submit reports, proposals, and recommendations to ECOSOC (including creation
of human rights instruments); (2) conduct studies for ECOSOC or any other U.N.-related
human rights institution; (3) assist ECOSOC in coordinating human rights activities; (4) take
steps to promote and encourage human rights and improve their effective enjoyment. See
E.S.C. Res. 5, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. for Jan. 23-Feb. 18, 1946, at 163, U.N. Doc.
[EIPV.1-14] (1946); E.S.C. Res. 9, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., Supp. for May 25-June 21, 1946,
at 400, U.N. Doc. [E/PV.1-15] (1946); E.S.C. Res. 1979/36, supra note 139, 1 16.
143. The CHR currently supervises the work of, among others, special working groups and
rapporteurs on disappearances, executions, torture, religious intolerance, mercenaries, arbitrary
detentions, and children. See Parker & Weissbrodt, supra note 91, at 573, 593-604. The CHR
also directly supervises the activities of its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities and its equally numerous working groups and rapporteurs. See
id. at 604-08; infra text accompanying notes 150-53.
144. See supra note 43. Finding a "breach" or "threat to peace" is the Charter's
prerequisite for collective security actions by the Security Council. See U.N. CHARTER arts.
39, 41-42. Nevertheless, the United Nations has never developed clearly defined legal criteria
specifying what a threat to or breach of peace entails, relying instead upon vague political
criteria. See Paul C. Szasz, Role of the United Nations in InternationalConflicts, 13 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 345, 347-51 (1983).
145. See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 64-66, 71-74, 119, 130; see also Franck & Fairley,
supra note 124, at 312-23; van Boven, supra note 5, at 96-98. The CHR's focus on
"situations" may ameliorate these weaknesses somewhat by compelling CHR scrutiny only
where overwhelming numbers of complaints establishing a "pattern" of abuse make overall
factual error unlikely. This does not change the critical fact, however, that political
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CHR decision-making is overtly political rather than quasi-judicial or
administrative. Thus, its decisions regarding human rights result from
considerations of State self-interest and geopolitics, rather than impartial
fact-finding and application of standards. Indeed, many would argue that
the CHR's public debates of human rights "situations" have proven
primarily to be a forum for political rhetoric and State maneuvering."
The CHR has no express mandate to "apply" or interpret the meaning
and specific content of rights, 47 although its general promotional and
supervisory duties imply some such capacity. Nor do the CHR's primary
activities easily lend themselves to the task of generating authoritative
interpretations of rights. By their very nature, confidential deliberations
under Resolution 1503 preclude publicly visible interpretive work which
could enhance the authoritativeness of interpretations of specific human
rights standards. Since public debate pursuant to Resolution 1235 is
limited to consideration of "situations" involving a "consistent pattern"
of "gross" human rights abuses, 4 ' this primary CHR activity almost never
focuses on the content or meaning of any particular right. Moreover, the
CHR has shown no inclination in this context to render interpretations.
Rather, deliberations proceed without the CHR as a body ever specifically
defining the specific requirements or meaning of the rights being
addressed. The result has been that any limited interpretive gloss such
debates might have regarding U.N. members' human rights obligations is
essentially lost through vagueness and notoriously inconsistent, politically
influenced pronouncements. 149
The most important subsidiary body of the CHR is the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 5 The

considerations rather than facts determine the CHR's reactions to human rights situations
around the world. See sources cited infra note 146.
146. See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 29, 70-71, 153-54, 174, 198-205; Reed Brody et al.,
The 42nd Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminationand Protection of

Minorities, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 260, 263 n.8 (1991) ("Votes on country resolutions in the
Commission are more likely to reflect relations with a particular country than the human rights
situation..."); see also Eric Lane, Mass Killing by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal

Order?, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 239, 273 (1979) ("a deception creating an illusion of
concern and activity"); Parker & Weissbrodt, supra note 91, at 579-60, 584-85, 589; Brody
et al., supra note 120, at 559, 587 (growing north-south divisions highly politicizing the CHR's
work); Torkel Opsahl, Instruments of Implementation of Human Rights, 10 HuM. RTS. L.J. 13,
26-27 (1989).
147. In the early years of the United Nations, ECOSOC approved the CHR's self-imposed
incapacity to consider individual complaints of human rights violations. See E.S.C. Res. 728,
U.N. ESCOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 18, 19, U.N. Doc. E/3290 (1959).
148. E.S.C. Res. 1235, supra note 140,
2, 3.
149. None of this should be surprising, of course, given that the CHR is an overtly
political policy body composed of government representatives rather than independent experts.
See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 204; Donnelly, supra note 117, at 612.
150. See generally TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 154-97; Reierson & Weissbrodt, supra note
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Sub-Commission, unlike the CHR, is comprised of twenty-six experts
who, at least formally, work independently of State affiliations. The Sub-

Commission's primary functions, parallel to those of the CHR, include
the consideration and screening of "situations" involving a "consistent
pattern of violations of human rights," pursuant to Resolutions 1503 and
1235, and the preparation of expert studies. 151 In this regard, the Sub-

Commission supervises and directs the activities of many rapporteurs and
working groups concerned with studying human rights or investigating

violations. 152

Although the Sub-Commission's decisions regarding

(potentially peace threatening) situations of gross human rights violations
under Resolutions 1503 and 1235 appear to be more impartial and
credible than the CHR's, it has virtually no binding legal authority and
a very limited mandate. Moreover, its work is hardly free from
politicization and is increasingly subject to the restrictive supervision of
the CHR.'53 Similarly, although the Sub-Commission has done some
significant work on developing the content of existing standards through
the preparation of expert academic studies and drafting declarations and
guidelines regarding specific rights, it has neither the capacity nor legal
mandate to impose such interpretations on States. 154

100; Brody et al., supra note 146; Robin M. Maher & David Weissbrodt, The 41st Session of
The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminationand Protection of Minorities, 12
HUM. RTS. Q. 290 (1990).
151. E.S.C. Res. 1235, supra note 140, ft 2, 3.
152. See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 172-79; Maher & Weissbrodt, supra note 150, at
309-26; Reierson & Weissbrodt, supra note 100, at 247-70.
153. The Sub-Commission, whose members are essentially selected by the governmental
representatives serving on the CHR, always has been the subject of serious complaints about
politicization. See, e.g., TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 71, 74-76, 125, 180; John P. Humphrey,
The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discriminationand the Protection
of Minorities,62 AM. J. INT'L L. 869, 869-70 (1968); Panel, Reforming UnitedNations Human
Rights Lawmaking, supra note 120, at 176 (remarks of Theodore Meron); Brody et al., supra
note 146, at 261-63, 289. In 1989, in order to lessen political pressures, the Sub-Commission
adopted new procedures involving secret voting; however, their work continues to be affected
by governmental and regional block pressures. See Maher & Weissbrodt, supra note 150, at
291, 297-301, 305-08; Brody et al., supra note 146, at 272, 274, 289-90. The Commission,
while approving secret votes when a majority of the Sub-Commission so decides, see Parker
& Weissbrodt, supra note 91, at 605-06, has itself mounted increasing political pressure against
the Sub-Commission by becoming progressively more critical of the Sub-Commission's
independent work. See id. at 604-08; Reierson & Weissbrodt, supra note 100, at 247-57;
Brody et al., supra note 146, at 261-63 ("the real motive for curbing Sub-Commission
involvement ... [may be] to eliminate one forum where country specific violations are
discussed").
154. See TOLLEY, supra note 75, at 134-46; Reierson & Weissbrodt, supra note 100, at
247-57; Brody et al., supra note 146, at 275-89. The Sub-Commission's interpretations of
norms have also been weakened by compromises forced through consensus voting and political
maneuvering. Id.; see also Dona D. Fischer, Note, Reporting Under the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: The First Five Years of the Human Rights Committee, 76 AM. J. INT'L L.
142,149-51 (1982) (discussing the problems and strengths of consensus voting at the HRC);
DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1 3.38 (1990). The work of Sub-
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2. Multilateral Treaty Monitoring Bodies
Although there are some differences among the decision-making, factfinding, and interpretive processes available under the various major
human rights treaties, each follows the same general pattern. Typically,
the treaty creates a committee of independent experts with four primary
functions: (1) review of State Parties' periodic reports on progress in

implementing rights; (2) issuance of "general comments" or "recommendations" regarding those reports; and, for States which expressly consent,
(3) mediation of interstate complaints; and (4) consideration of individual

petitions.'

At least in principle, each of these committee functions

offers some opportunities for establishing the factual predicates for human
rights-based collective security decisions and for rendering interpretations
of the rights contained in the treaties. The extent to which these
opportunities are meaningfully exploitedin practice, however, is largely
a function of how each particular institution - and the State Parties have construed its mandate and function. In this regard, a review of the
work of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant' S156 (CPRC) Human
Rights Committee (HRC) is typical and instructive.
Like other treaty-based expert committees, the United Nations
designed the HRC 57 primarily to assist States in promoting human rights
rather than as a true, quasi-judicial fact-finder and watchdog over State
behavior. 5 The HRC has also construed its mandate narrowly. HRC

Commission experts, while useful, clearly lacks authoritative legal status. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 1054 (remarks
of Diane Orentlicher) (with General Assembly endorsement such work may become
suggestive).
155. See, e.g., CPRC, supra note 47, arts. 40-42; Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signatureDec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
302-46 [hereinafter CPRC Optional Protocol]; CERD, supra note 49, arts. 9, 11-12, 14;
CEDAW, supra note 50, arts. 18-21; CAT, supra note 133, arts. 19, 21-22. Neither CEDAW
nor ESCRC have provisions for either interstate or individual complaints. (Note, however, that
CEDAW article 29 provides for referral of interstate disputes to arbitration or the International
Court of Justice.) Nor, until 1985, did the ESCRC have a committee of experts assigned to
monitor State compliance. See ESCRC, supra note 48, arts. 16, 19, 21; E.S.C. Res. 17, U.N.
ESCOR, 1985 Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85 (1986). The ESCRC Committee
has been authorized by ECOSOC to formulate general comments. See E.S.C. Res. 5, U.N.
ESCOR, 1987 Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 10, U.N. Doc. E/1987/87 (1987); G.A. Res. 102, U.N.
GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 202, U.N. Doc. A/42/49 (1987).
156. Supra note 47.
157. For a description of the critical role of States and the General Assembly's Third
Committee in creating a much more restrictive role for the HRC than originally contemplated
by the CHR see Farrakh Jhabvala, The Practiceof the Covenant's Human Rights Committee,
1976--82: Review of State Party Reports, 6 HuM. RTs. Q. 81 (1984).
158. See, e.g., id.at 85-86, 88, 95, 104; Andrew C. Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights
Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6-7 (1989).
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review of periodic State reports on implementation has been conducted
primarily with the goal of creating "a constructive dialogue" between the
HRC experts and the State Parties.'59 While the experts often ask
pointed, probing questions of the State representatives,'6° the HRC's work
here is essentially dependent on State cooperation' 6 ' - a questionable
institutional arrangement for establishing the State's violation of human
rights. 62 Indeed, by committee consensus, the HRC reaches no overt
committee conclusions whatsoever regarding whether the State has
violated any specific obligation. No votes are taken, no committee
findings are made, and there are no official majority positions adopted by
the HRC regarding the State reports. 63 Thus, the periodic reporting
system is incapable of either providing credible decisions about factual
circumstances or authoritative guidance concerning the specific content
and meaning of CPRC rights.64
The HRC and the other committees have also interpreted the power
to issue "general comments" narrowly. By consensus, although not
without dispute, 65 the HRC's general comments provide no official

159. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, in 2.21, 3.3, 3.5, 3.21; Jhabvala, supra note 157, at
88-89; see also Byrnes, supra note 158, at 19-23 (regarding CEDAW). This dialogue
primarily takes place during exchanges between HRC members and State representatives who
appear in person before the committee to present the periodic reports and answer questions.
MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, 3.20.
160. McGOLDRICK,supra note 154,U 3.4, 3.21, 3.28, 6.3, 10.3,11.6,11.8; see Donnelly,
supra note 117, at 610.
161. See Byrnes, supra note 158, at 4-12.
162. See Donnelly, supra note 117, at 610 (State reports as a source of information are
"flawed" and at times "farcical"); see also Jhabvala, supra note 157, at 85-88. Although
technically the factual information relied upon by the HRC is only submitted by the State
Parties or U.N. agencies, in practice the human rights committee experts informally receive and
rely on information supplied by non-governmental organizations. See, e.g., Byrnes, supra note
158, at 35. Although currently instrumental to the functioning of the human rights system,
there are serious institutional questions about extensive reliance on information compiled by
non-governmental organizations as an untested basis for U.N. decision-making. Cf., Hurst
Hannum, Fact-Findingby Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations, in FACT-FINDING
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 127, at 293-303 (describing the distinguishing
characteristics of fact-finding by non-governmental organizations).
163. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, H 3.21, 3.24; Donnelly, supra note 117, at 609.
164. To some degree the individual committee member's views on the specific content and
requirements of CPRC rights are discernible from the dialogue and the committee's requests
for supplemental information. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, 9N 3.20, 3.25-28, 10.58,
11.6. In addition, some committee members now routinely submit individual views ("final
observations") which evaluate weaknesses in the States' implementation efforts. Id. 3.24; see
also Manfred Nowak, UN-Human Rights Committee: Survey of Decisions up to July 1986, 7
HuM. RTS. L.J. 287, 289 (1986). While these sources of opinion could eventually be
influential, they are not legally authoritative.

165. McGoldrick gives a detailed account of the on-going debate within the HRC about
whether its mandate allows the Committee to find violations of the CPRC or issue country
specific reports and comments. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, U 3.29-3.34; see alsoJhabvala,
supra note 157, at 92-93, 95, 105.
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commentary evaluating particular violations or country-specific conditions. 166 The HRC's mandate to issue such comments, however, provides
a potential gold mine of interpretive guidance regarding the CPRC's
relatively indeterminate norms. 67 Although this potential has not been
completely realized in practice, the HRC's substantive observations about
CPRC rights may eventually provide some of the necessary future
guidance.168 The HRC does not, however, render such interpretations by
applying CPRC norms to concrete situations - a process essential to
providing clear interpretive guidance as to the specific content and
meaning of rights. It is difficult to render effective interpretations of
sometimes controversial and textually elastic rights, in the context of
profound diversity, through abstraction alone.
Most importantly, the States have purposefully not given the HRC,
or any other treaty committee, a clear mandate to find violations or
pronounce authoritative interpretations.1 69 Each committee's views are
non-binding recommendations and no committee has any enforcement
powers whatsoever - nor direct recourse to other institutions which
do.' 70 Perhaps as a result of its limited authority, neither the committees'
review of State reports nor their general comments appear to have
received widespread respect from the State Parties themselves. 7 ' In truth,

166. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154,
3.34-3.44; see also Byrnes, supra note '158, at
43-46, 49 (neither CERD nor CEDAW have used general comments or "recommendations" to
develop substantive interpretations or render country specific findings).
167. See Jhabvala, supra note 157, at 105; Byrnes, supra note 158, at 42-51 (describing
general comment interpretations by CERD, CEDAW, and the HRC).
168. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, n 3.29-3.44, 11.25; see also Byrnes, supra note
158, at 47-49, 51; MERON, supra note 57, at 123-26; Opsahl, supra note 146, at 21, 31-34.
169. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, 3.49; Jhabvala, supra note 157, at 84-95, 105;
see also Byrnes, supra note 158, at 12, 17, 46-51; MERON, supra note 57, at 10-11, 80-85,
112, 123-25. See generally Donnelly, supra note 117, at 605-11, 614-18. The lack of
mandate is clearly reflected in the HRC's carefully worded justifications for issuing general
comments which address the substantive content of CPRC rights. According to the HRC such
comments are designed merely to share the HRC's experience - not to serve as authoritative
interpretations binding on the States. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, Annex
XII, U.N. GAOR. 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981); see also UNITED
NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORTING OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES TO UNITED

NATIONS INSTRUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
20, U.N. Doc. A/44/98 (1989) [hereinafter
REPORTING OBLIGATIONS] (identical wording used by ESCRC Committee).
170. See supra notes 139, 142, 147, 154, 163, 167; infra notes 174-78. These deficiencies
have been compounded by financial and institutional constraints forcing the committees to limit
their work significantly. See Report on Implementation, supra note 15, f1 36-102, 106;
REPORTING OBLIGATIONS, supra note 169, 1 70; REPORT ON THE STATUS OF CERD, supra note
51,16.
171. In the case of State reports, this lack of respect is perhaps best evidenced by the
abundance of overdue and inadequate State reports. See, e.g., Report on Implementation,supra
note 15, H 6-7, 20, 34 (citing 626 overdue reports in 1988 within the U.N. treaty system);
REPORTING OBLIGATIONS, supra note 169,
11, 22, 55. Even among those States timely
submitting reports, many have not taken their obligation to report very seriously. Indeed, many

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 14:827

State incentives to comply are few and ineffective. The limitations of
general comments and the periodic reporting system described above are
partly intrinsic to non-judicial bodies of experts whose effectiveness is
ultimately subject to the cooperation and consent of the parties whose

performance they monitor."

In any case, neither the treaty bodies'

review of State reports nor their general comments enjoy the institutional
mandate, earned credentials, or perception of credibility among States
necessary to make their
work a legitimate basis for actions relating to
73
peace and security.
3. Judicial and Quasi-judicial Procedures
The U.N. human rights treaty system also provides some limited,

quasi-judicial administrative procedures for resolving alleged treaty
violations, either in the form of State to State complaints or individual
communications." Both types of procedures are available only against

States which have expressly consented to them.
Interstate procedures, which are currently available under the CPRC,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
and the Convention Against Torture,' 75 would appear to have strong

States have (perhaps naturally) merely submitted cursory, self-congratulatory reports which
vaguely describe general conditions in their country, recite formal legal enactments, or
disingenuously assert that all human rights outlined in the treaty are already fully guaranteed
by the existing domestic legal system. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154,1 3.4, 3.12; Byrnes,
supra note 158, at 14 nn.41-42, 22-28; Jhabvala, supra note 157, at 89-91, 102-03; Report
on Implementation, supra note 15, 34. Moreover, there is scant evidence that State Parties
have paid serious attention to any committee's suggestions of the need for concrete changes
in their domestic legal system to meet treaty obligations. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154,
I 3.44-3.49; Jhabvala, supra note 157, at 95, 102-04; Scott Leckie, An Overview and
Appraisal of the Fifth Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

13 HUM. Rrs. Q. 545, 547 (1991); see also Byrnes, supra note 158, at 65-66; Opsahl, supra
note 146, at 33-34. But see Cindy A. Cohn, The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes
Related to the Human Rights Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13
HuM. RTs. Q. 295 (1991) (suggesting that at least on a formal level many States have claimed
or promised to make domestic changes in order to comply with the CPRC).
172. See Byrnes, supra note 158, at 4-7; Jhabvala, supra note 157, at 85-95, 104; see also
MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, If 2.21-2.22. The committees monitoring CERD and CEDAW
have made even more restrictive choices than the HRC regarding review of State reports and
general comments. See Byrnes, supra note 158, at 18-28, 43-46, 49; Donnelly, supra note
117, at 630-35. One commentator has rather optimistically reported that the ESCRC
Committee, in contrast, has taken an expansive view of its mandate. See Leckie, supra note
171, at 545-49, 555-56, 558-61.
173. Practices regarding State reports and general comments under the ESCRC, CERD,
and CEDAW vary in detail but are identical in substance to those of the HRC. See Byrnes,
supra note 158, at 4, 14, 23, 25-26, 47-49, 56-57, 65-66. Each treaty also appears to suffer
from similar weaknesses in mandate, procedures, and credibility.
174. See supra note 155.
175: Id.; CPRC, supra note 47, art. 41; CERD, supra note 49, arts. 11-13; CAT, supra
note 133, art. 21.
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potential both for establishing the factual predicates for subsequent human
rights-based collective security actions and for rendering meaningful
interpretations of rights. Unfortunately, very few States176have consented
to these procedures, and they have never been utilized.
Individual petitions are currently available under the CPRC's Optional
Protocol, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, and the Convention Against Torture.' 7 Since it is highly
unlikely that such petitions - unless submitted in massive numbers would establish human rights violations posing threats to peace, their
primary significance for present purposes lies in their potential for giving
specific content to critical rights. Indeed, at present these procedures
represent the only opportunity within the U.N. system for interpretive
guidance based
upon the application of rights to concrete, pending
178
controversies.
Although providing this unique opportunity, the treaty system's
individual petition procedures suffer from serious limitations in this
regard. First, as with interstate complaints, the scope of jurisdiction is
quite limited, involving only disputes under the relevant treaty and among
the relatively limited number of States agreeing to the individual
communication procedures." 79 Second, as is true with the Committees'
other activities, the individual complaint procedures give the committees
extremely limited authority. The committees' "views" on alleged
violations and appropriate remedies are non-binding and the committees
have neither enforcement power of their own nor direct recourse to other
institutions which do.' 8° The committees', views in any particular case,
including its interpretations of the rights involved, do not technically

176. For example, as of 1989 only 23 States recognized the HRC's competence to handle
interstate complaints and no State had ever brought one. Opsahl, supra note 146, at 21.
177. CPRC Optional Protocol, supra note 155, art. 1; CERD, supra note 49, art. 14; CAT,
supra note 133, art. 22.
178. In principle, the International Court of Justice could also resolve such concrete
disputes. See infra text accompanying notes 183-91.
179. There are currently 50 State Parties to the CPRC's Optional Protocol. See supra note
51. Only 14 States have accepted individual communication procedures under CERD. Id.
CAT has been ratified or acceded to by 52 States - 23 of which have declared the CAT
Committee's competence to consider individual "communications." UNITED NATIONS,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT; STATUS OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, 'ff 5-6,

U.N. Doc. A/45/405 (1990).
180. See, e.g., MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, I 3.49, 4.38-4.39; MERON, supra note 57,
at 46; CAT, supra note 155, art. 22(7). Opsahl, who for ten years served on the HRC, has
noted that although "not even theoretically binding," the HRC's "views" are "normally
accepted" by the State. Opsahl, supra note 146, at 22; see also Dominic McGoldrick,
Canadian Indians' CulturalRights and the Human Rights Committee, 40 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q.

658, 667 (1991).
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create precedent binding on other States subject to the procedures much less other parties to the treaty. 8' Third, the process by which the
committees arrive at their views in individual cases lacks many of the
institutional attributes necessary to engender State respect and, in turn,
voluntary compliance with their decisions. Besides the limitations on
institutional authority described above, the procedures suffer from
extremely weak fact-finding mechanisms." 2 Moreover, the committees
have historically demonstrated only a marginal capacity to create an
effective jurisprudence regarding either the interpretation process or the
substantive content of the rights they apply." 3 The committees' weaknesses in this regard are conceivably the result of the inherent limitations
of institutions comprised of non-judicial experts from extremely diverse
backgrounds working under governmental pressures and on the basis of
consensus decision-making." s4
In this regard, the committees stand in sharp contrast to the only truly
judicial forum at the United Nations, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).1s5 As a potential forum for interpreting rights and credibly
determining violations, the ICJ has many of the institutional attributes
necessary for authoritative, credible decision-making. 186 Indeed, the

181.
182.
Roger S.
FIELD OF

See supra note 180.
See, e.g., Opsahl, supra note 146, at 23; MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154,
4.23-4.26;
Clark, Legal Representation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 105, at 114-17. For example, the committees' fact-

finding typically consists only of receiving written responses submitted by government officials
and the alleged victim: there is no provision for oral testimony, no rules of evidence, and very
little follow up. See, e.g., MCGOLDRICK, supra note 154, IN 4.23-4.26.

183. For example, the HRC has expressed an intention to utilize certain interpretive
principles that mirror those in the Vienna Convention on Treaties. See MCGOLDRICK, supra
note 154, 1 4.46-4.47, 8.27-8.28. Yet the Committee's general comments and State report
"dialogues" leave unclear whether the HRC views the interpretation process as one which
focuses primarily on original intent of the State Parties, emphasizes treaty language as
dispositive, takes a teleological orientation in which the purposes of the treaty and the rights
declared are used as central interpretive guides, or utilizes some combination of these or other
approaches. See McGOLDRICK, supra note 154, n][
3.29-3.35, 4.47, 8.28. Nor has the HRC
clearly dealt with the issues of national discretion and cultural diversity when interpreting the
substance of rights. See, e.g., id. in 4.46-4.48, 6.1-6.10, 9.11-9.15, 10.59-10.61. This
weakness is also reflected in the committee's ad hoc approach to cases and its common failure
to issue cohesive, coherent written opinions providing an underlying rationale for its views on
alleged violations of the treaty's provisions. See, e.g., id. 1 9.16-9.18, 9.29-9.31.
184. See supra notes 152-53.
185. U.N. CHARTER" arts. 1, 7, 36, 92-96. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987) [hereinafter CROSSROADS].

186. Strong international ambivalence towards the ICJ has persisted, however, particularly
regarding its appropriateness as a forum for resolving so-called "political" disputes. See
generally CROSSROADS, supra note 185, pt. II. Some States have also questioned the Court's
impartiality and criticized the process by which judges are selected. See Fred L. Morrison, The
Future of International Adjudication, 75 MINN. L. REv. 827, 827-38, 841-43 (1991); see also
Monroe Leigh & Stephen D. Ramsey, Confidence in the Court: It Need Not Be a "Hollow
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World Court would appear uniquely situated to deliver dispositive,
impartial, and authoritative decisions relating to human rights disputes
and violations which may threaten international peace. 187 The ICJ also
has a well-developed jurisprudence and has historically demonstrated a
capacity for rendering authoritative interpretations of treaties and
customary international law.
As currently situated, however, the ICJ's potential role in interpreting
human rights and determining the factual predicates for international
action based upon their violation is extremely limited. Beyond some
lingering questions about impartiality,' 88 the primary source of this
limitation lies in the restrictive scope of the ICJ's jurisdiction. Recourse
to the Court is limited to State parties which have consented to its
jurisdiction and select international organizations. Is9 In principle, States
agreeing to the ICJ's jurisdiction - whether by declaration accepting
compulsory jurisdiction, by treaty, or by ad hoc agreement - could seek
application and interpretation of human rights norms by suing each other
before the ICJ. 9 However, even assuming fulfillment of the conditions
necessary for such contentious jurisdiction, no State currently possesses
either the political will or confidence in the Court necessary to bring
cases on behalf of individuals or groups for human rights violations
occurring in other countries.' 91 The same can be said about the potential

Chamber", in CROSSROADS, supra note 185, at 106-22; Abraham D. Sofaer, Statement by the
Legal Advisor, Abraham Sofaer, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW at 298-300 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1991).

187. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (Southwest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J.
16 (June 21); Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (October 16); see also
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (April 14) (request for provisional
measures), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 665 (1992); Richard B. Bilder, International Dispute
Settlement and the Role of International Adjudication, in CROSSROADS, supra note 185, at

155-80 (describing advantages, disadvantages, and distinguishing characteristics of adjudication
of international disputes).
188. See supra note 186.
189. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 34(1), 36, 65(1), 59
Stat. 1031, 1059-60, 1063, 3 Bevans 1153 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; see also U.N. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE at 6-7, 10-12, U.N. Sales No. E.69.1.18 (1969). Proposed HRC
authority to seek ICJ advisory opinions was specifically rejected by the General Assembly's
Third Committee during the CPRC's drafting process. See Jhabvala, supra note 157, at 84.
190. See ICJ Statute, supra note 189, art. 36.
191. See Opsahl, supra note 146, at 18. But see Carter & Trimble, supra note 186, at 273
(discussing a Soviet proposal to subject interpretation disputes under six major human rights
treaties to ICJ compulsory jurisdiction). ICJ adjudication of human rights violations might also
raise complex issues of standing, injury, and appropriate remedy. The State Parties' claim
would essentially be that another State's violation of the human rights of its own citizens within
its own borders breached an international obligation to the claimant State.
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for advisory opinions sought by U.N. institutions." 2 Thus, without
significant reform, including changes to the ICJ's jurisdictional rules, the
Court is unlikely to play a significant role in interpreting human rights
standards and determining their violation in the near future.' 93
C. Central Flaws in the InternationalHuman Rights
Decision-making and InterpretationProcess
Three central characteristics of the U.N.'s human rights regime must
be addressed if human rights considerations are to play a prominent and
positive peace keeping role in a reformed United Nations. First, and
perhaps most importantly, the U.N.'s existing interpretation and decisionmaking process is too decentralized and badly in need of rationalization.
There is, for example, no central United Nations body with the singular
authority to interpret and apply a unified set of international human rights
norms thought binding on all nations. Instead, for each of the possible
sources of State obligation there are distinct, but often overlapping,
sources of decision-making and interpretation - none of which is
authoritative.'" This dilution of responsibility and lack of authority
ultimately undermines the credibility and effectiveness of both the norms
and institutions involved. Moreover, it means that the system lacks a
coherent, authoritative voice with the institutional credentials and mandate
to generate interpretations of the meaning and specific content of rights
and to render credible, impartial decisions regarding their application that
can engender State respect and compliance. In sum, the United Nations'
human rights regime speaks with too many feeble voices.
Second, existing human rights institutions lack sufficient mechanisms
for developing the needed interpretations of rights and rendering credible
decisions regarding their violation. As described in Part III.B., the
primary opportunities for human rights decision-making by Charter-based
institutions are ill-suited to credible fact-finding or developing authoritative interpretations of the specific requirements of rights.'95 Multilateral
treaty-based mechanisms, such as periodic State reporting procedures and
general comments, have been too narrowly construed by the relevant

192. ICJ advisory opinions could be particularly useful in the context of giving
authoritative legal content to controversial rights such as the right to self-determination - or
in resolving conflicts between rights. At present, however, U.N. institutions authorized to seek

such opinions appear to lack confidence in the Court and the political will to bring such cases.
This lack of confidence is perhaps not surprising since all of the international organizations
authorized to bring such cases are political bodies which directly reflect States' interests. See
supra notes 149, 152-53.
193. Cf. Opsahl, supra note 146, at 18, 29.

194. See supra text accompanying notes 102-12, 132-37, 147, 152-56, 167-70, 178.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 132-53.
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institutions and State Parties to fulfill these roles. Interstate and
individual complaint procedures such as the CPRC's Optional Protocol
have greater potential for providing the needed interpretations of rights,
but the treaty-based monitoring bodies have neither the authority,
jurisdictional scope, nor institutional characteristics likely to generate
widespread State respect and compliance. Perhaps most importantly, the
entire U.N. human rights system suffers from a cumbersome, flawed factfinding process." Ultimately, if human rights considerations are to play
a prominent role in U.N. peace keeping activities, more effective
procedures for fairly presenting concrete cases and situations to an
authoritative fact-finder must be developed."9
Third, existing U.N. institutions have yet to develop a sufficient
jurisprudence regarding the decision-making, fact-finding and interpretation process itself. Widely accepted rules governing this critical process
are crucial to the ultimate legitimacy of any institution's decisions."'
Especially important in this regard is the system's failure to develop any
sound approach to the problematic implications of profound diversity."9
Many writers have described the importance of context and culture to a
society's values and in turn its understanding about the meaning and
content of international human rights norms. 2w As the international
human rights system increasingly turns its attention to issues of implementation and enforcement, the potential for such culturally and politically based conflicts will greatly increase, especially as rights take on more
concrete meaning. Such conflicts also reflect an unresolved tension
between the need to recognize and respect diversity versus the need for
universal specific content for human rights - a tension which poses
potentially enormous problems for any meaningful international

196. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46, 162, 180.
197. Arguably these mechanisms could be modeled after existing regional judicial or
quasi-judicial forums, such as those effectively utilized by the European and Inter-American
human rights regimes. See Opsahl, supra note 146, at 29.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21, 28, 37, 114, 117-29.
199. An important factor in achieving State compliance with international human rights
is the conformity of those rights to the cultural, social, and political context of the particular
State. See An-Na'im, supra note 59. In this regard, Thomas Franck describes "symbolic
validation" as one condition for an international rule's "legitimacy." At least in part, Franck
means that a rule which is "culturally authentic" has a greater capacity "to communicate in the
context of a particular time and place and to a certain population". See Franck, Prospects,
supra note 1, at 632 n. 117; FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 91-96. It seems selfevident that rights which conform to the cultural, social, and political expectations of a given
society will be more meaningful to that society and more likely to be fully implemented and
enforced. Indeed, some authors have suggested that in order for rights to be effective, the
cultural, social, and political context is and should be the primary determinant of what rights
mean. See Pollis & Schwab, supra note 46. But see Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community,
and Human Rights, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 57, at 81.
200. See supra notes 80-81, 129.
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enforcement of human rights norms.20' U.N. institutions have failed to
develop a conceptual approach to address this tension, much less a
jurisprudence which provides mediating techniques through which
legitimate variations in rights might be accommodated while at the same
time providing the requisite degree of universality. If human rights, and
in particular rights of democratic participation, are to figure positively and
prominently in U.N. efforts to secure world peace, such techniques particularly in the interpretation and monitoring process
must be
devised by the international human rights system.
-

CONCLUSION:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PEACE

KEEPING PROCESS - AN ENFORCEMENT VERSUS
PROMOTIONAL MODEL OF REFORM

As described above, the U.N. human rights regime currently lacks the
well-defined, commonly understood norms, authoritative interpretive
processes, and credible decision-making which are essential to effective
international norms and institutions. These normative and institutional
weaknesses have direct implications for the potential role of human rights
in preserving international peace and security. Critical to the success of
any enforcement-oriented reform model, for example, would be the need
for a centralized, coherent decision-making process which could
authoritatively interpret the specific content and meaning of indeterminate
human rights norms and credibly resolve factual disputes. If, as many
reformers suggest, human rights considerations ought to be utilized as the
2°2
basis for various collective actions by the U.N.'s political institutions,
then realistic, radical institutional development would be necessary to
rationalize the system's normative and institutional decision-making
hierarchy.
Attempts to enforce ill-defined and controversial norms whose
specific content and meaning have been insufficiently developed through
an accepted, credible decision-making process, will be regarded as
illegitimate by the international community and will stand little chance of
engendering widespread State respect or compliance.2 °3 The existing U.N.

201. See generally Donoho, supra note 55, at 386-91.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15.
203. At present even the selection of which rights should be deemed sufficiently important
to peace to justify collective action would be fraught with disagreement and controversy
reflecting unresolved conflicts between States over basic social and cultural priorities. All of
the most likely candidates, such as self-determination, political participation, or so-called
"democratic entitlement" rights, are among those rights most susceptible to cultural and political
variations and least susceptible to specific definitions that could be well-understood and
universally accepted among diverse States. Agreement on a set of rights will be particularly
difficult to achieve so long as the international legal system relies predominately on principles
of sovereignty, State equality, and consensual obligation.
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institutional framework for interpreting and monitoring human rights is
incapable of providing the guidance, specific content, or fact-finding
necessary to legitimize collective enforcement actions based upon such
rights. In essence, human rights as currently constituted are insufficiently
mature to serve as a basis for collective enforcement actions. Without
radical institutional reforms it would appear that only an increased
promotional role for international human rights in the peace keeping
efforts of the United Nations is realistic.
Ultimately, the central underlying issue is defining the role of
international human rights and human rights institutions in the world
governing process. Expanding the role of human rights in the peace
keeping process would require that international human rights institutions
move dynamically from the overtly political, weak supervisory capacity
they now serve to a much more authoritative role in which their
interpretations of the specific content and meaning of rights would be
implemented by the U.N.'s political organs to promote peace and
security. As currently situated however, it is clear that most of the
international community strongly favors vaguely worded norms and the
extremely weak international supervisory role of the U.N.'s human rights
institutions.
Whatever the future role of U.N. human rights institutions in
promoting peace, reforms designed to address the weaknesses described
above are imperative to the ultimate effectiveness of human rights
generally. Hopefully, such a reform process will eventually help the
international community arrive at a greater understanding of the meaning
and specific content of those rights most important to world peace.
Ultimately, such reform may allow these norms to serve the prominent
role urged by some commentators.

